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ASSEMBLING A SUSTAINABLE SYSTEM:
EXPLORING THE SYSTEMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO 
PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
SUSTAINABILITY
Jill Robbie* and Elsabé van der Sijde**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Property is an institution which can lead to the concentra-
tion of resource and power in the hands of too few people. The 
regulation of property rights can respond to this by aiming to lim-
it the potentially negative effects the exercise of property rights 
can have on people and the environment. The issue of the extent 
to which property should be subject to regulation has been, and 
will continue to be, a highly controversial issue in many jurisdic-
tions. These debates are only likely to become more heated as 
there are increasing pressures on land and other resources 
caused by global trends, such as intensifying environmental deg-
radation, population growth, rising inequality and accelerating 
industrialization. This article explores the relationship between 
property and regulation within the context of the need to progress 
to a more sustainable way of life.
To investigate the relationship between property and regula-
tion, this article compares the approach to property in the two ju-
risdictions of Scotland and South Africa. Arguably, these two 
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countries could not be more different; everything from the weath-
er to politics are worlds apart. In the past, comparative legal re-
search could be justified with reference to both countries’ mixed 
legal systems, but in light of South Africa’s radical departure 
from its legal heritage after the end of Apartheid, this link has 
become tenuous. The dissimilarities between the two countries 
led Carey Miller to conclude in 2014 that “[t]he position regarding 
private law and the protection of the human right of property in 
South Africa and Scotland is too different for any comparative ex-
ercise to have primary utility.”1 This then raises the question: 
Why undertake comparative research between these two coun-
tries, especially in relation to topics as contentious as property 
law and sustainability that inevitably touch on the protection of 
property as a human right?
In this article, we question whether this dismissal of com-
parative research into constitutional property law questions in 
Scotland and South Africa should be reconsidered, especially in 
light of recent developments in Scotland. Specifically, this article 
analyzes the Scottish Government’s Land Rights and Responsibil-
ities Statement (LRRS)2 and the reference to the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT)3 in Scot-
land. In our view, these two documents are responses to certain 
problems caused or exacerbated by current property law regimes. 
These documents attempt to place property within a broader sys-
tem of values that regulates the exercise of property rights. From 
this perspective, the LRRS and the VGGT have this in common 
with the South African Constitution. Furthermore, as is the case 
in South Africa, the Scottish Government’s LRRS and FAO’s 
VGGT also connect property rights with issues such as inequality, 
insecure tenure, environmental degradation, and climate change. 
These challenges are of a global scale and nature, and tackling 
them requires a reconsideration of property’s role and place with-
in a legal system. With sustainable development emerging as a 
1. David Carey Miller, The Human Right of Property in Land Law: Comparing 
South Africa and Scotland, in PRIVATE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 480 (2014).
2. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, SCOTTISH LAND RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
STATEMENT (2017). 
3. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), 
VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND,
FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2012).
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key organizing principle for governance in some countries and re-
gions,4 and a transition to sustainability becoming ever more ur-
gent, it is necessary to re-evaluate many areas of law, including 
property law, in light of such global challenges. The evaluation of 
property rights against a background of multiple complex contex-
tual factors—in particular, dramatic socio-economic inequality—
is an ongoing and expansive process in South Africa. Hence, this 
article argues that valuable lessons can be learned from the 
South African experience in this context.
Taking an approach which directly compares doctrinally dif-
ferent types of legal instruments, namely a supreme constitution 
with an international soft-law instrument and a national policy 
document, will necessarily be problematic. The fact that some 
underlying concerns behind these documents are similar is not 
enough to justify direct comparison between them. Fortunately, 
this is not our intention. Instead, this article explores the poten-
tial of an approach to property and its regulation, developed in 
South Africa, to inform us about soft law instruments that have 
emerged in places other than the particular context of South Afri-
ca. The question is: What can the South African systemic consti-
tutional approach tell us about other documents that are also re-
sponding to complex property problems? This article proposes 
that the systemic constitutional approach in South Africa offers a 
useful example of the methodological and theoretical shifts that 
are required in legal systems, which are in the process of change, 
and here the change we focus on is the transition to sustainabil-
ity.
The structure of this article is that, firstly, we describe the 
new developments in Scotland, introducing and analyzing both 
the Scottish Government’s LRRS and the FAO’s VGGT. Common 
features of these documents include a human rights-based ap-
proach to land governance, an emphasis on the responsibilities of 
the holders of land rights, and the placement of property within a 
broader system of values, which includes sustainable develop-
ment.
Secondly, we outline aspects of Scots private law methodolo-
gy, and also the Scottish legal system, which could minimize the 
potential transformative effect of these documents. Recent aca-
4. Demonstrated most recently by the adoption in 2015 of Transforming our 
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. See G.A. Res. 70/1 (Sept. 25, 
2015).
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demic work on property in Scotland has been focused on system-
building and ensuring conceptual coherence. One key element of 
this property system has been a strict division between personal 
and real rights, with ownership - in principle absolute and exclu-
sive - being at the top of the hierarchy of real rights. This tradi-
tional doctrinal research, and the resulting property law reform,
has been viewed as separate from politically motivated reforms, 
such as creating rights for communities to buy land or providing 
access rights over privately owned land. There is also a rigid divi-
sion between public and private law in Scotland, and as such the 
implementation of a human rights-based approach to land gov-
ernance has not been widely discussed. These features create bar-
riers for the implementation of the vision of the LRRS and VGGT.
Thirdly, we consider how the existing methodology in Scot-
land could be changed in order to realize the aims of the LRRS 
and VGGT, and we go on to discuss the systemic constitutional 
approach, which has been developed in South Africa to address 
some of the shortcomings of its previous private law methodology. 
This approach takes as its starting point that there is a single 
system of law and all sources of law are subject to the Constitu-
tion.5 Property has a relatively modest role in this system.6
Therefore, property rights may have to give way if a clash arises 
between a property right and a fundamental non-property right 
or value. This perspective avoids the paradox that can be created 
when property is seen as a keystone right, which can inhibit 
measures of regulation or redistribution. Rather, the regulation of 
property is an inherent part of a constitutional legal system and 
serves an important systemic purpose. Taking this “angle of ap-
proach”7 shows a facilitative relationship between property and 
regulation.8 Therefore, a sustainable property system can be 
5. This point of departure is based on § 2 of the South African Constitution, 
which declares it the supreme law of the country and determines that all law or con-
duct contrary to the Constitution is invalid. S. AFR. CONST., § II, 1996.
6. The “modest systemic status of property” was a phrase coined by Van der 
Walt. André J. van der Walt, The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1 J.L.
PROP. & SOC’Y 15 (2014).
7. The phrase “angle of approach” was used by Henk Botha at a workshop in 
2007 and later in Henk Botha, Refusal, Postapartheid Constitutionalism, and the Cry 
of Winnie Mandela, in REFUSAL, TRANSITIONS, AND POST-APARTHEID LAW (2009), to 
avoid the “pretence of a technique that produces ready or final answers.” See ANDRÉ
J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 105 (2012).
8. Elsabé van der Sijde, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Property and 
Regulation: A Systemic Constitutional Approach 172-73, 285-91 (Aug. 2015) (LL.D. 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University).”
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achieved through regulation that promotes and protects the 
broader values of the legal system. This angle of approach com-
plements, rather than hinders the vision contained in the LRRS 
and VGGT.
Finally, we consider what Scotland can learn from the South 
African experience. Adopting the single-system-of-law principle in 
Scotland would mean that the distinction between political and 
doctrinal property law reforms would melt away. It would also 
encourage engagement with areas such as environmental law, 
and investigation into how these rules affect the conceptualiza-
tion of property. The argument that ownership is, in principle, 
absolute and exclusive would become untenable. Further, the an-
gle of approach that this article proposes would require consider-
ation of how fundamental rights and values, such as sustainable 
development, can be operationalized in legal analysis. We then 
discuss two concrete examples of cases. In one case, taking the 
angle of approach would indicate that legislative reforms are re-
quired and a different outcome to the case would then be possible. 
In the other, the angle of approach supports the decision. We con-
clude by admitting that there is no magic formula which will al-
ways provide the clear answers to property problems in the con-
text of sustainability. However, in this article we are exploring 
how property law and private law methodology should be recon-
sidered in this context. As such, we adopt Michelman’s stance 
when he says: “I am more interested in ways of thinking about 
certain legal problems, and in ways of saying what the significant
factors are, than I am in doctrinally formulated summaries or 
predictions of outcomes.”9 Above all, we are seeking to contribute 
to the debate regarding the transition to sustainability and see 
the role of property as significant in that transition.
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCOTLAND
A. BACKGROUND
The ownership of land and the exercise of ownership rights 
have been persistently problematic in Scotland.10 As noted by the 
9. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 10 (1969).
10. For a historical overview, see Ewen A. Cameron, Still on the Agenda? The 
Strange Survival of the Scottish Land Question, 1880-1999, in LAND REFORM IN 
SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 94 (2020); Malcolm Combe, Parts 2 and 3 of 
the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 3 JURID. REV 195 (2006); W. David H. Sellar, 
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historian Ewen Cameron, “[t]he land question has remained in 
the bloodstream of Scottish politics and in the cultural memory of 
Scotland.”11 One of the most prominent issues is that a range of 
historical factors have combined to result in a concentration of 
large areas of land in the hands of few people.12 This inequality, 
of resource and of power, has numerous on-going consequences, 
many of which are still being explored.13 Successive governments 
in Westminster have attempted to tackle issues related to land in 
Scotland, but the approach has been limited and piecemeal.14 On-
ly when Scotland acquired its own parliament in 1999, was there 
the possibility of a greater range of land reform measures, which 
could begin to deal with matters in a more comprehensive way.15
By the time the Land Reform Review Group (LRRG) published its 
final report in 2014 entitled “The Land of Scotland and the Com-
mon Good,” nineteen Acts of the Scottish Parliament were listed 
as containing land reform provisions, including the two particu-
larly significant instances of the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2000 and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
The LRRS is a product of the latest instalment of land reform 
measures, which was instigated by the LRRG’s report.16
B. LAND RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STATEMENT
The LRRG was a working group set up by the Scottish Gov-
ernment with the remit to examine “the role of Scotland’s system 
of land ownership in the relationship between the people and the 
The Great Land Debate and the Land (Scotland) Act 2003, 60 NORSK GEOGRAFISK 
TIDSSKRIFT [NOR. J. GEOG.] 100, 101 (2006). 
11. Ewen A. Cameron, Still on the Agenda? The Strange Survival of the Scottish 
Land Question, 1880-1999, in LAND REFORM IN SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND 
POLICY 94, 109 (2020).
12. LAND REFORM REVIEW GROUP, THE LAND OF SCOTLAND AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 156-64 (2014); STEVEN THOMSON ET AL., REPORT TO THE SCOTTISH 
GOVERNMENT, THE IMPACT OF DIVERSITY OF OWNERSHIP SCALE ON SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES 19 (2106).
13. THOMSON ET AL., supra note 12; SHONA GLENN ET AL., SCOTTISH LAND 
COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION INTO THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH LARGE SCALE AND 
CONCENTRATED LANDOWNERSHIP IN SCOTLAND (2019). 
14. Ewen A. Cameron, Still on the Agenda? The Strange Survival of the Scottish 
Land Question, 1880-1999, in LAND REFORM IN SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND 
POLICY 94 (2020); Malcolm Combe, Parts 2 and 3 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003, 3 JURID. REV 195 (2006).
15. LAND REFORM REVIEW GROUP, supra note 12, at 24.
16. Frankie McCarthy, Property Rights and Human Rights in Scottish Land Re-
form, in LAND REFORM IN SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 94, 215 (2020).
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land of Scotland” in order to make proposals for land reform.17
There was a significant amount of political and public engage-
ment with issues related to land around this time in Scotland and 
important land reform legislation has been enacted in the past 
few years.18 The parliamentary debates were backed by social 
movements like “Our Land,” featuring people like prominent land 
campaigner, and now Member of the Scottish Parliament for the 
Scottish Green Party, Andy Wightman, which encouraged the 
government to be bold in its reforms, to challenge the current 
concentration of land ownership in Scotland, and to promote 
transparency of information about the ownership of land.19
A key product of the recent wave of reforms was the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2016.20 Among other things, the 2016 Act 
added to the growing list of community rights-to-buy21 and also 
created a legislative basis for the Scottish Land Commission, a 
new body which has been tasked with reviewing, researching, and 
recommending changes to, the laws and policies relating to land 
in Scotland.22 Section 1 of this Act also requires the Scottish Min-
isters to produce a Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement.23
The LRRS has three aims which have been articulated by the 
Scottish Government: Firstly, to “inform the development of Gov-
ernment policy and action in relation to land”; Secondly, “to en-
courage and support others with significant responsibilities over 
land such as local authorities and large private land owners, to 
consider how their decision-making powers could contribute to 
realising the vision in the Statement”; Thirdly, “to encourage us 
17. LAND REFORM REVIEW GROUP, supra note 12, at 15.
18. Such as the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, (ASP 6), and 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18).
19. Michael Gray, #OurLand Campaign Launches to Challenge @ScotGov Land 
Reform Proposals, OUR LAND: SCOTTISH LAND FESTIVAL 2015 (Aug. 12, 2015): 
https://www.commonspace.scot/articles/2110/ourland-campaign-launches-to-
challenge-scotgov-land-reform-proposals.
20. For a summary of the provisions of the Act, see Malcolm Combe, Parts 2 and 3 
of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 3 JURID. REV 195, 291 (2006).
21. On community rights-to-buy, see Malcolm Combe, Legislating for Community 
Land Rights, in LAND REFORM IN SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 154 (2020), 
and John A. Lovett, Towards Sustainable Community Ownership: A Comparative
Assessment of Scotland’s New Compulsory Community Right to Buy, in LAND 
REFORM IN SCOTLAND: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 177 (2020).
22. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18) § 22, ¶ 1. See the Scottish Land 
Commission’s Website here: https://landcommission.gov.scot/.
23. Id. § 1, ¶ 1.
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all to recognise our responsibilities as well as our rights in rela-
tion to land.”24
In preparing the LRRS, the Scottish Ministers were required 
to have regard for, among other things, “promoting respect for, 
and observance of, relevant human rights”; “promoting respect for 
such internationally accepted principles and standards for re-
sponsible practices in relation to land as the Scottish Ministers 
consider to be relevant”; and “furthering the achievement of sus-
tainable development in relation to land.”25 In this context, hu-
man rights has a broad meaning and includes those rights pro-
tected not just by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), but also those contained in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).26 This means 
that not just civil and political rights, such as the right to life or 
the right to respect for private and family life are significant, but 
also economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to an 
adequate standard of living and the right to participation in cul-
tural life. In defining internationally accepted principles and 
standards, the 2016 Act makes specific reference to the FAO’s 
VGGT, which are discussed in more detail further below.27 The 
final LRRS was published on September 28, 2017. Within the re-
sulting document, there are six principles which are worth quot-
ing in full:
1. The overall framework of land rights, responsibilities and 
public policies should promote, fulfil and respect relevant 
human rights in relation to land, contribute to public interest 
and wellbeing, and balance public and private interests. The 
framework should support sustainable economic develop-
ment, protect and enhance the environment, help achieve so-
cial justice and build a fairer society.
2. There should be a more diverse pattern of land ownership
and tenure, with more opportunities for citizens to own, lease 
and have access to land.
3. More local communities should have the opportunity to 
own, lease or use buildings and land which can contribute to 
their community’s wellbeing and future development.
24. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 6-4.
25. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18) § 1, ¶ 3(a), (b), (g).
26. Id. § 1, ¶ 6.
27. Id. § 1, ¶ 5.
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4. The holders of land rights should exercise these rights in 
ways that take account of their responsibilities to meet high 
standards of land ownership, management and use. Acting as 
the stewards of Scotland’s land resource for future genera-
tions they contribute to sustainable growth and a modern, 
successful country.
5. There should be improved transparency of information 
about the ownership, use and management of land, and this 
should be publicly available, clear and contain relevant de-
tail.
6. There should be greater collaboration and community en-
gagement in decisions about land.28
There are several important features of this new national 
policy document, many of which are intertwined. Firstly, the 
LRRS adopts a human rights-based approach to land governance. 
Previously, Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR (Art 1, Pro 1) was 
the only right referred to in the land reform context.29 Indeed, ar-
guments based on Art 1, Pro 1 were often used in order to prevent 
land reform measures being implemented.30 Following the publi-
cation of the Scottish Human Rights Commission’s first Action 
Plan in 2013, there was greater recognition of the scope for the 
progressive realization of all human rights through the imple-
mentation of land reform including social, economic, and cultural 
rights.31 When the newly established Scottish Land Commission 
published a Programme of Work for 2018-2021—which entails re-
view of such diverse areas as redevelopment of vacant and dere-
28. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 9.
29. McCarthy, supra note 16, at 214. The text of Art 1, Pro 1 reads: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way im-
pair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the 
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
30. Id. at 214-216. See also Kirsteen Shields, Tackling the Misuse of Rights Rheto-
ric in the Land Debate, 68 GREEN’S SCOTTISH HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2015). McCarthy ar-
gues in her chapter that the positioning of Art 1, Pro 1 as a barrier to land reform is 
a mischaracterisation. Using the work of Singer, McCarthy argues that Art 1, Pro 1 
provides a way to ensure all interests in land are considered and is a valuable tool for 
implementing the vison of the LRRS. We respectfully differ in our analysis here by 
promoting our angle of approach which is explained further below. 
31. SCOTTISH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, SCOTLAND’S NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2013-2017 (2013). 
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lict land; community rights-to-buy; community engagement in 
land use decision-making and agricultural tenancies32—Shields 
argued that within these areas there is scope for the progressive 
realization of a range of human rights such as the right to food, 
health, housing, education, and the right to take part in cultural 
life.33 The articulation of a broad human rights-based approach to 
land governance in the LRRS strengthens this viewpoint and 
marks a significant turning point in the understanding of the in-
teraction between human rights and land reform.
A second connected point is that the LRRS emphasizes the 
responsibilities of holders of land rights. The advisory notes state 
that: “With all rights come responsibilities. Some of these are 
regulatory requirements, and others of an ethical nature . . . .”34
There are responsibilities to communities on which decisions 
about land can have an impact and also environmental responsi-
bilities to future generations. This is a robust recognition of the 
implications and consequences that the exercise of property 
rights can have on matters of social justice and environmental 
protection: the public nature of private rights. The role of regula-
tion is explicitly recognized as placing duties on the holders of 
land rights which are designed to protect both people and the en-
vironment.35 Furthermore, although there is discussion of a “bal-
ance” between public and private interests in Principle 1, the ad-
visory notes to the LRRS do not suggest these are diametrically 
opposed. Rather, “[the] public interest should not necessarily be 
thought of in opposition to private interest. Public interest in-
cludes the effect on individuals who are also members of the pub-
lic.”36
Thirdly, it is recognized that the system of land rights and 
their regulation are embedded within a greater system of values, 
which includes sustainable development, community empower-
ment, and transparency of information. The UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals are mentioned in the LRRS as a relevant in-
ternational standard and it is noted that the challenges the SDGs 
attempt to tackle such as “inequality, unsustainable consumption 
32. See SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION, MAKING MORE OF SCOTLAND’S LAND: PIR 
STRATEGIC PLAN 2108 TO 2021 (2018).
33. KIRSTEEN SHIELDS, SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
WORK OF THE SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION (2018).
34. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 11.
35. Id. at 25. 
36. Id. at 13. 
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and production patterns, inadequate infrastructure and lack of 
adequate employment” are also reflected in the LRRS.37 Values 
such as sustainable development, community empowerment and 
transparency of information are being consistently discussed 
within the Scottish context and pervade the policy landscape of 
the Scottish Government from the broad National Performance 
Framework38 down to national sectoral policies such as the Scot-
tish Rural Development Programme39 and 2020 Challenge for 
Scotland’s Biodiversity.40
Fourthly, although there is recognition in Principle 2 and 3 
of the importance of diversifying ownership rights, there is also 
acknowledgement that access to land can be important for reali-
zation of human rights and the broader system of values and en-
gagement with communities in decision-making in relation to 
land is important. In recent years, there have been a number of 
rights which have been granted to communities to allow them to 
force the transfer of areas of land in an attempt to fragment the 
concentration of ownership in Scotland.41 Undoubtedly, redistri-
bution of the benefits of land and natural resources is crucial to 
ensuring social equality, particularly when historically such bene-
fits have been concentrated in the hands of a privileged few. 
However, a report commissioned by the Scottish Government in 
2016, stated that “it is too simplistic to conclude that scale of land 
ownership is a significant factor in the sustainable development 
37. Id. at 39.
38. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK (2018). This 
updated version of the Framework has been published since the LRRS was pub-
lished. The Framework directly links each national indicator with the Sustainable 
Development Goals. However, it should be noted that the Scottish Government has 
tended to focus on the concept of “sustainable economic growth” rather than the 
broader concept of “sustainable development”. For a critique of this, see Andrea Ross, 
The Future Scotland Wants – is it really all about Sustainable Economic Growth?,
19(1) EDINBURGH L. R. 66 (2015). Ross has pointed out recently that in relation to 
land reform, there has been a maturing of the implementation and delivery of sus-
tainable development in Scotland, Andrea Ross, The Evolution of Sustainable Devel-
opment in Scotland – A Case Study of Community Right-to-Buy Law and Policy 2003-
2018, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 130 (2019). 
39. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, SCOTTISH RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 2014
TO 2020 (2015). 
40. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, 2020 CHALLENGE FOR SCOTLAND’S BIODIVERSITY
(2013). The policy context of the LRRS is demonstrated in the useful table in 
SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, SCOTTISH LAND RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STATEMENT
42 (2017). 
41. Combe, supra note 21; Lovett, supra note 21.
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of communities.”42 This report identified general socio-economic 
factors such as regional economic growth, housing developments, 
infrastructure, and improved standards of living as being key 
forces of change.43 This confirms the importance of not viewing 
property rights in isolation but seeing them as a functioning ele-
ment of a system of governance, and this governance system then 
fitting within a broader social, economic, historical, and political 
context. Property rights are an important component of a govern-
ance system, but not the only component, and attention should 
also be paid to the position of those without property rights and 
how their human rights can be promoted in relation to the land. 
As argued in a recent Scottish Land Commission report, much of 
the inequality relating to land in Scotland emerges from an im-
balance of power and participation.44 Ownership is often central 
in determining the location of power, and therefore who decides 
the extent of participation in decision-making. However, the 
LRRS recognizes that there should be more opportunities for citi-
zens to have access to land, that more communities should have 
the opportunity to use buildings and land which can contribute to 
their wellbeing and future development, and there should be 
greater community engagement in relation to decisions about 
land.
In relation to this point, beyond the LRRS, under section 44 
of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, the Scottish Ministers 
were required to issue guidance about engaging communities in 
decisions relating to land. Subsequently, guidance has been is-
sued by the Scottish Government on community engagement.45
The purpose of the guidance is “to help ensure that people have 
the opportunity to be involved in decisions about land that affect 
them.”46 The guidance provides examples of informal engagement 
with communities including putting notices on community notice 
boards or posting on social media, which may be appropriate 
when there are decisions that can have moderately significant 
impacts on the local community.47 Such decisions may involve 
42. THOMSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
43. Id.
44. GLENN ET AL., supra note 13, at 22, cited supra note 42..
45. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, GUIDANCE ON ENGAGING COMMUNITIES IN 
DECISIONS RELATING TO LAND (2018). 
46. Id. at ¶ 14. See also SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
IN DECISIONS RELATING TO LAND (2019).
47. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 45, at 14.
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short-term but disruptive activities in relation to land or activi-
ties carried out in irregular circumstances. Formal methods of 
engagement including publishing a written consultation, holding 
local meetings or “collaborating with a community to co-design a 
project,” may be appropriate for decisions that will significantly 
impact the community such, as long-term changes to land use 
with effects on the local economy, society, culture or environ-
ment.48 The guidance encourages engagement regardless of prop-
erty rights and specifies the importance of engaging the vulnera-
ble in society. The guidance states:
In relation to poverty and social inequality, Articles 6 and 11 
of ICESCR . . . are very relevant . . . these Articles provide for 
the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of 
living, including the rights to adequate food and housing and 
the right to a continuous improvement in living conditions. It 
is particularly important that people living in areas of pov-
erty and social deprivation, in both urban and rural Scotland, 
are given the opportunity to engage with decisions about land 
that can help them improve their conditions in line with Arti-
cles 6 and 11 of the ICESCR.49
Failure to adhere to the guidance also has potential consequenc-
es, as when determining whether to grant an application by a 
community for the right-to-buy to further sustainable develop-
ment, the Scottish Ministers may take into account the extent to 
which regard has been had to this guidance.50 When outlining 
equality and engagement with ethnic groups, Scottish Gyp-
sy/Traveller communities are also specifically mentioned.51 This 
is a group which has suffered from discrimination in the UK and 
eviction due to unlawful occupation of land.52
Finally, the process of the creation of the LRRS was through 
democratic debate and participation. A draft of the LRRS was is-
sued for public consultation between December 16, 2016, and 
March 10, 2017. The Government then issued a response to the 
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18, ¶ 26. 
50. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18) § 56, ¶ (4).
51. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 45, at 19 ¶ 32.
52. For an overview of the case law in the English courts and European Court of 
Human Rights, see ANDRE J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 161-166
(2009). A Ministerial Working Group was also established in Scotland in 2018 on im-
proving the lives of Scottish Gypsy/Traveller communities. 
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consultation results.53 The Government also organised a public 
participation workshop to obtain feedback on the proposed 
LRRS.54 As McCarthy comments, the values of our property sys-
tem “have been the subject of sustained debate in this county for 
decades, and the current consensus is now encapsulated within 
the LRRS.”55 All of the listed features of the LRRS combine to 
provide a radical exposition of the vision of the system of land 
rights and their regulation in Scotland. This final point, however, 
serves to underline the democratic legitimacy of the document 
due to the participatory approach to policymaking. This is not a 
meaningless document that can be ignored or side-lined. Instead, 
as noted in the overview to the LRRS, this document intended to 
have far-reaching effects.56 Not least, of course, the LRRS has 
implications for legal practitioners, legal academics, and law re-
formers.
C. VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY
As mentioned above, when preparing the LRRS, the Scottish 
Ministers had to have regard to the desirability of promoting re-
spect for the FAO’s VGGT.57 The Scottish Ministers had the same 
duty when preparing the guidance on community engagement.58
These are among the first examples of the VGGT being referred 
to in a national law context.59 The resulting LRRS and guidance 
on community engagement make explicit reference to the 
VGGT,60 and there are some significant similarities in the ap-
proach of the LRRS and the VGGT, which shows the influence of 
the latter on the former. Due to the important connection be-
tween the LRRS and the VGGT, and the similarities between the 
53. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, LAND RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STATEMENT: A
CONSULTATION (2016); SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, SCOTTISH LAND RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES STATEMENT: CONSULTATION RESPONSE REPORT (2017).
54. Held on October 19, 2016 at Reidvale Community Centre, Glasgow. Dr. Robbie 
took part in this workshop. 
55. McCarthy, supra note 16, 234.
56. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, 6-7.
57. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18), § 1, ¶ 3(b), ¶ 5.
58. Id. § 44, ¶ 2(b), ¶ 4.
59. Lorenzo Cotula, International Soft-Law Instruments and Global Resource Gov-
ernance, 13 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 115, 127 (2017). 
60. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 39; SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT,
GUIDANCE ON ENGAGING COMMUNITIES IN DECISIONS RELATING TO LAND Annex A, ¶ 
supra note 45, at 17 ¶ 24. 
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet N
o. 143 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet No. 143 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
C M
Y K
_8-ROBBIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 3:26 PM
2020] Assembling A Sustainable System 567
documents, this section will give some background to the VGGT, 
outline their content and compare them with the LRRS. The simi-
larities between the documents indicate a global movement to-
wards placing property within a broad system of values including 
respect for human rights and sustainable development. However, 
there is also a question raised when analyzing the VGGT of what 
the appropriate role of property is in tackling complex global chal-
lenges.
The FAO has been working on raising awareness of the good 
governance of land tenure for the last two decades.61 This work 
has been upon the background that recent years have witnessed 
global transformations which have affected land and natural re-
source management and governance, including an increasing 
number of large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land in develop-
ing countries by powerful foreign public or private actors.62 A re-
cent Land Matrix63 report summarizes that Africa is the most 
targeted continent for these types of transactions, with 422 com-
pleted agricultural deals since the year 2000, covering an area of 
almost 10 million hectares. Asia has the second largest number of 
deals, with 305 deals covering 4.9 million hectares.64 The Land 
Matrix report provides an example of a large-scale land invest-
ment in the Yala Swamp in Kenya relating to 6,900 hectares of 
swampland. U.S. investor Dominion Farms Ltd. leased the area 
primarily to produce rice.65 However, the draining of the swamp-
land has affected the livelihoods of those who benefited from the 
swamp’s natural resources, and 60% of the land has not been put 
to productive use.66 The reasons for the so-called “land grabbing” 
have been connected with the attempt to obtain areas of land for 
food and energy production or control over freshwater resources.67
61. See FAO Webpage: http://www.fao.org/tenure/en/.
62. See overview Cotula, supra note 59; Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: 
Markets, Rights and the Politics of Food 49 STAN. J. INT’L L., 101 (2013); Amnon Le-
havi, Land Law in the Age of Globalization and Land Grabbing, in COMPARATIVE 
PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 290 (2017).
63. Land Matrix is an independent, global land monitoring initiative which tracks 
large-scale land acquisitions in low and middle-income countries. See Land Matrix: 
https://landmatrix.org/ .
64. KERSTIN NOLTE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS FOR AGRICULTURE.
FRESH INSIGHTS FROM THE LAND MATRIX: ANALYTICAL REPORT II 16 ¶ 2.4.1 (2016). 
65. Id at 45 Box 13.
66. Id.
67. Lehavi, supra note 62; Jampel Dell’Angelo et al., The Global Water Grabbing 
Syndrome, 143 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 276 (2018). 
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When acquisitions take place, there can be forced evictions, wide-
spread displacement of people and intense environmental degra-
dation.68 Vulnerable groups, such as local farmers, women, and 
indigenous people, can be among the worst affected by these 
transactions.69 As such, the VGGT were produced in the context 
of significant problems caused by the acquisition of property 
rights in land and the exercise of these rights.
The VGGT were drafted in the institutional framework of 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)70 and are the first 
global document which gives comprehensive guidance on the gov-
ernance of land. The VGGT state that they are intended to “serve 
as a reference and to provide guidance to improve the governance 
of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the overarching goal 
of achieving food security for all and to support the progressive 
realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national 
food security.”71 The VGGT are obviously a different type of doc-
ument when compared to the LRRS. They constitute an interna-
tional soft-law instrument which is global in scope and this is no-
ticeable in the extensive use of the concept of “tenure.”72 This 
term is quite deliberately vague and undefined so that it can be 
tailored to the specific context of national jurisdictions.73 Never-
theless, there are some important normative similarities between 
the VGGT and LRRS. Both are responses to problems of inequali-
ty and environmental degradation which are caused or exacer-
bated by current property regimes. The angle of response in both 
documents shares important characteristics. The VGGT take a 
human rights-based approach to the governance of land. It is af-
68. See generally Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farm-
land and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (2011).
69. Lehavi, supra note 62, at 293.
70. Nora McKeon, ‘One Does Not Sell the Land Upon Which the People Walk:’ 
Land Grabbing, Transnational Rural Social Movements, and Global Governance,
10(1) GLOBALIZATIONS 105 (2013).
71. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71, at 2 ¶ 2.2, 6 ¶ 4.2.
72. This can be defined as “the relationship, whether legally or customarily de-
fined, between people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land.” FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, LAND TENURE AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 7 ¶ 3.1 (2002); see also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS, RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE AND THE LAW 19
(2016). 
73. There are implementation guides provided by the FAO. See FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS: http://www.fao.org/tenure/
resources/collections/governance-of-tenure-technical-guides/en/
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firmed in the VGGT that they are complementary to, and sup-
port, national, regional and international initiatives which aim to 
promote human rights, and that States should ensure that all ac-
tions in relation to tenure are consistent with their existing obli-
gations under national and international law, taking into consid-
eration voluntary commitments of regional and international 
agreements.74 The VGGT acknowledge the core role land plays in 
the fulfilment of human rights with the statement that States 
“should strive to ensure responsible governance of tenure because 
land, fisheries and forests are central for the realization of human 
rights, food security, poverty eradication, sustainable livelihoods, 
social stability, housing security, rural development, and social 
and economic growth.”75
The VGGT go on to consider an exceptionally broad range of 
issues with chapters on markets and investments,76 restitution 
and redistribution,77 valuation and taxation78 as well as climate 
change and natural disasters.79 Verstappen describes the VGGT 
as a “global empirical study on the main legal and governance 
shortages of tenure systems.”80 This broad and interconnected 
approach makes sense, as the VGGT were initiated and developed 
by the FAO in order to consolidate their policies in relation to 
land governance.81 The public nature of private law is once again 
reaffirmed with matters of social justice and environmental pro-
tection being at the forefront of the Guidelines. In this context, it 
is envisaged that there is a system of regulation of tenure that 
promotes sustainable development, and which involves duties 
and respect for others’ rights. The VGGT state:
74. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71, at 2 ¶ 2.2, 6 ¶ 4.2.
75. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at 6 ¶
4.1.
76. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at at 19-
23.
77. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at 25-
27.
78. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at 30-31.
79. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at 35-36.
80. Leon Verstappen, Multilevel Governance of Property Titles in Land, in 
REGULATORY PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRANSFORMING NOTION OF PROPERTY IN 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS REGULATION 98, 109 (2016).
81. Philip Seufert, The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, 10(1) GLOBALIZATIONS 181, 183 (2013). 
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All parties should recognize that no tenure right, including 
private ownership, is absolute. All tenure rights are limited 
by the rights of others and by measures taken by States nec-
essary for public purposes. Such measures should be deter-
mined by law, solely for the purpose of promoting general 
welfare including environmental protection and consistent 
with States’ human rights obligations. Tenure rights are also 
balanced by duties. All should respect the long-term protec-
tion and sustainable use of land, fisheries and forests.82
This paragraph is addressed to “all parties” and not just the 
States. However, in the remainder of the document, the directions 
are largely State-focused.83 This is understandable due to the na-
ture of the VGGT. The onus lies with States to create and im-
prove systems of governance to fulfil the aspirations of the VGGT. 
Moreover, this speaks to one of the central challenges of property 
law in a modern context; the actions or inactions of private own-
ers can have the greatest influence on the lives, aspirations and 
flourishing of others and yet it is the State which primarily has 
the responsibility for promoting, protecting and fulfilling human 
rights.
The VGGT also explicitly recognize that governance of land 
should be embedded in a greater system of values, many of which 
are shared with the LRRS. They list principles of implementation 
in the section on “Guiding Principles of Responsible Tenure Gov-
ernance,” which expressly connect land governance with human 
dignity, non-discrimination, equity and justice, gender equality, 
holistic and sustainable approach, consultation and participation, 
rule of law, transparency, accountability, and continuous im-
provement.84 Each value is given a short explanation and, under 
“holistic and sustainable approach,” the document recognizes 
“that natural resources and their uses are interconnected,” and 
adopts “an integrated and sustainable approach to their admin-
82. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71 at 6 ¶ 4.3.
83. There are however still some important acknowledgments of the responsibili-
ties of non-State actors. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, Id. at 6 ¶ 3.2, 19 ¶ 9.1, 20 ¶ 11.7, 23 ¶ 12.12.
84. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOLUNTARY 
GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, Id. at 4-5.
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istration.”85 This outlines the fundamental guiding values which 
are pervasive throughout the whole document.
Again, like the LRRS, the VGGT were drafted through a pro-
cess of participation. Between 2009 and 2010, extensive multi-
stakeholder consultations in the drafting process took place. Al-
most 700 people from 133 countries participated, representing the 
public and private sectors, civil society (such as social movements 
and NGOs), and academics.86 The VGGT were then unanimously 
endorsed by the CFS in 2012. Seufert comments that it “is this 
experiment in global democracy that ascribes a high level of legit-
imacy and political weight to the Voluntary Guidelines.”87 This 
process also increases the likelihood of the VGGT being imple-
mented into national legal orders and adhered to by a range of ac-
tors.88
There is, however, a point of divergence between the two 
documents. The VGGT arguably reveal the dichotomous nature of 
property rights to a greater extent than the LRRS. Both have 
been drafted in the context of the concentration of property rights 
and the exercise of those rights which have had negative social 
and environmental effects. The VGGT are then focused on pro-
tecting people with “legitimate tenure rights.” “Legitimate” here 
does not mean merely those rights which have been formally rec-
ognized by law, but also those which are socially legitimate, such 
as customary and indigenous rights.89 It is stated:
States should recognize and respect all legitimate tenure 
right holders and their rights. They should take reasonable 
measures to identify, record and respect legitimate tenure 
right holders and their rights, whether formally recorded or 
not; to refrain from the infringement of tenure rights of oth-
ers; and to meet the duties associated with tenure rights.90
85. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71 at 5.
86. David Palmer et al., Fostering a New Global Consensus: The Voluntary Guide-
lines on the Governance of Tenure, 12(1) LAND TENURE J. 19, 30 (2012).
87. Seufert, supra note 81 at 184. See also David Palmer et al., Fostering a New 
Global Consensus: The Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure, 12(1) 
LAND TENURE J. 19 (2012).
88. Cotula, supra note 59, at 118.
89. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE AND THE LAW 19 (2016).
90. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71 at 3 ¶ 3.1(1).
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This focus on protecting existing rights is due to the context 
of the large-scale acquisitions mentioned above which have in-
fringed many such rights. As many legitimate tenure rights have 
not been identified or recognized, there is guidance in the VGGT 
for how informal tenure and customary tenure rights can be rec-
ognised.91 However, the dominant focus is on those with rights.
What about the people with no rights?92 The centre of attention of 
the document is noted by Verstappen who states that “unlawful 
occupation as such is clearly not the focus of the Voluntary Guide-
lines.”93 However, often those without any legitimate rights, rec-
ognized either legally or socially, are in the most vulnerable posi-
tions, and will be among the most affected by the actions of land-
landowners. What should be the responsible governance of tenure 
in relation to those with no rights? Vulnerable people include 
subsistence farmers,94 nomadic pastoralists, indigenous people, 
gypsy travellers, homeless people, cohabiting partners with no 
formal right to occupy, those who use land informally or without 
the correct documentation, children, people who have historically 
been excluded from the land which is held by others and, crucially 
for sustainability, future generations.95
The VGGT are unclear whether the principle of “consultation 
and participation” extends to those without legitimate tenure 
rights. The explanation of this value in the guiding principles 
states “engaging with and seeking the support of those who, hav-
ing legitimate tenure rights, could be affected by decisions, prior 
to decisions being taken, and responding to their contributions.”96
This appears to limit consultation only to those with rights 
whereas under “Rights and Responsibilities Related to Tenure” it 
is noted:
States should welcome and facilitate the participation of us-
ers of land, fisheries and forests in order to be fully involved 
91. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Id. at 11-17.
92. This is recognized in Sofia Monsalve Suarez, The Recently Adopted Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, in RIGHT TO 
FOOD AND NUTRITION WATCH 2012 37 (2012).
93. Leon Verstappen, Multilevel Governance of Property Titles in Land, in 
REGULATORY PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRANSFORMING NOTION OF PROPERTY IN 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS REGULATION 98, 112 (2016).
94. De Schutter, supra note 68, at 524.
95. The issue of restitution of ancestral lands was a controversial issue in the 
drafting of the Guidelines. See Seubert, supra note 81, 185.
96. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71 at ¶ 3B.6 (emphasis added).
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in a participatory process of tenure governance, inter alia, 
formulation and implementation of policy and law and deci-
sions on territorial development, as appropriate to the roles 
of the State and non-state actors, and in line with national 
law and legislation.97
This would include those who lack legitimate tenure rights but 
nevertheless use the land.
The VGGT do mention, in a small number of instances, that 
in relation to people who do not have legitimate tenure rights, 
States should prevent forced evictions which are inconsistent 
with their existing obligations under national and international 
law.98 Further, it is stated:
Evictions and relocations should not result in individuals be-
ing rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of hu-
man rights. Where those affected are unable to provide for 
themselves, States should, to the extent that resources per-
mit, take appropriate measures to provide adequate alterna-
tive housing, resettlement or access to productive land, fish-
eries and forests, as the case may be.99
These are important provisions. However, it is clear that the 
focus of the VGGT is the protection and recording of existing le-
gitimate tenure rights. This observation raises the question about 
the role of protecting tenure rights in promoting the broader val-
ues contained in the document. This is also an issue at the centre 
of the Scottish debates regarding the LRRS and the land reform 
process generally. What is the location and role of property and 
its protection within a system of diversified values which is at-
tempting to tackle issues, such as inequality and environmental 
degradation, in order to support sustainable development? Before 
exploring that question more fully in section V, we will now con-
sider the features of the Scottish legal system and private law 
methodology which may limit the potentially transformative ef-
fect of these documents.
97. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOLUNTARY 
GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND 
FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ¶¶ 4.10, 9.7, 12.10 (2012)
(emphasis added). See also id. at ¶ 9.7 on indigenous and customary tenure systems 
and ¶ 12.10 on investments involving large-scale transactions. 
98. Id. at ¶¶ 7.6, 10.6, 16.9 (2012).
99. Id. at ¶ 16.9 (2012).
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III. BARRIERS TO REFORM IN SCOTLAND
In previous sections, we outlined important common features 
of the Scottish Government’s LRRS and the FAO’s VGGT which 
included: a human rights-based approach to the governance of 
land; a recognition of the broad consequences and implications 
the exercise of property rights can have on matters of social jus-
tice and environmental protection which requires the regulation 
of those rights; and an acknowledgement that land rights and
their regulation are embedded in a greater system of values, with 
sustainable development being prominent among those values. 
We noted that both these documents had been created through 
participatory processes which enhances their democratic legiti-
macy and therefore underlines the need to give them due consid-
eration. However, there are barriers in both private law method-
ology and the Scottish legal system which will inhibit fulfilment 
of the vision of both of these documents. To implement the vision 
in these documents, these elements of Scotland’s methodology 
and system need to be reconsidered. Some of these barriers are 
considered in the following paragraphs.
When undertaking a review of Scottish property law in 2017, 
Steven quoted Walker from 1985 who noted: “The law of property 
was rather neglected.”100 Steven is pleased to note that the posi-
tion has since then been transformed. “Property law today is ar-
guably the engine room of Scots private law scholarship.”101 Ste-
ven notes the particular contribution of Reid and Gretton. The 
former is renowned in Scotland for his work in systematizing the 
body of Scottish property jurisprudence with The Law of Property 
in Scotland.102 Both have published widely in matters of Scottish 
property law. They both also worked as Scottish Law Commis-
sioners on property law projects including abolishing the feudal 
system as well as reforming the law of title conditions, tene-
ments, and land registration. Due to the neglect which Scottish 
property law had suffered in the past, much of the recent academ-
ic research into, and reform of, property law has been focused on 
system-building; drawing out principles and aligning jurispru-
dence into a coherent whole, based on Scotland’s primarily Ro-
man law foundations. This work has contributed to maintaining 
100. DAVID M. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH JURISTS 420 (1985).
101. Andrew J.M. Steven, Scottish Property Law 2017, 1 JURID. REV. 21, 29 (2017). 
102. KENNETH G.C. REID, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN SCOTLAND (1996). This first 
appeared as Vol. 18 of the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia in 1993. 
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Scotland’s identity as a Mixed Legal System, separate to and dis-
tinct from its English neighbour.103 However, the methodology 
applied in this process could be described as a traditional doctri-
nal methodology which has its adherents in both Common law
and Civil law jurisdictions.104
Abolishing the feudal system was an important step in this 
period of reform. Before abolition, although much of the system 
had been attenuated, the theoretical structure of feudalism re-
mained. As stated in the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on 
Abolition of the Feudal System:
There is still a notional pyramid of interests in land with the 
Crown, the paramount superior, at the top and the owner of 
the domininum utile at the bottom. Each intermediate level 
in the pyramid is a separate estate in land, a mid-superiority 
or domininum directum, owned by a person who is a feudal 
superior in relation to the owner or owners at the level below 
and a vassal in relation to the owner or owners at the level 
above. The system is inherently and unnecessarily complex, 
involving as it does multiple “owners” of the same piece of 
land.105
The Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 erad-
icated this archaic system and replaced it with a system of out-
right landownership. This was a doctrinally revolutionary step 
which allowed the conceptual structure of Roman law to be ap-
plied more fully to immoveable property – extending the concept 
of the unitary law of property.106 The conceptual structure ap-
plied involves a strict division between personal rights and real 
rights,107 with ownership being the main real right in the hierar-
chy of real rights.108 The right of ownership is, in principle, abso-
103. See Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5
(2003).
104. See Andrew Burrows, Challenges for Private Law in the Twenty-First Century,
in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017); Martin Dixon, A Doctrinal Approach to 
Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?, in RESEARCHING PROPERTY LAW 
(2016); JAN M. SMITS, THE MIND AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL ACADEMIC (2012); Jan 
M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Doctrinal Re-
search, in RETHINKING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE (2017).
105. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ABOLITION OF THE FEUDAL 
SYSTEM, ¶ 1.9 (1999).
106. REID, Id. at 102, at ¶ 1.
107. REID, Id. at 102, at ¶ 3 (1996).
108. REID, supra note 102, at ¶¶ 4-5 (1996).
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lute and exclusive.109 These are characteristics of the “Rights 
Paradigm” which have been interrogated in detail by Van der 
Walt.110 To the extent that human rights were considered in the 
abolition of the feudal system, only Art 1, Pro 1 was discussed 
with regard to paying compensation to superiors who lost 
rights.111
The work of Gretton and Reid was vital work upon which all 
future research and reform builds. Yet, a divide began to be evi-
dent between doctrinal and political law reform in the area of 
property law. Again Steven, when reviewing the reasons that 
land law was being reformed in 2002, provided the following list: 
i) too much of land law is antique and outmoded; ii) too much has 
been left to common law which is in an unsatisfactory state; iii) 
some areas are unduly complicated; iv) some late-twentieth cen-
tury legislation is problematic (like the Land Registration (Scot-
land) Act 1979); v) before the introduction of the Scottish Parlia-
ment, the law reform process was slow; and finally vi) “some are 
of the view that parts of Scottish land law need change for politi-
cal reasons.”112 Within this last category, Steven explains:
There is a reasonably widely held view that debtors need 
greater protection from mortgage lenders. Likewise, there is 
also a generally held view that rural land law needs to be 
overhauled, in particular with regards to access rights and 
allowing communities to buy the land where they live and 
work.113
Within this collection of reasons, the first five can be collated as 
doctrinal modifications and the remaining reason is politically 
motivated reform.
109. REID, supra note 102, at ¶ 195 (1996). Reid notes there are qualifications to 
the assertion that ownership is absolute and exclusive, as there are, of course, nu-
merous restrictions which exist at common law and in legislation on the exercise of 
ownership. See also WILLIAM M. GORDON & SCOTT WORTLEY, SCOTTISH LAND LAW
Vol. 1, ¶¶ 13.01-13-15 (3rd ed. 2009). For a discussion regarding whether these limita-
tions are internal or external to ownership, see infra Section IV.D. 
110. ANDRE J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 27-41 (2009).
111. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ABOLITION OF THE FEUDAL 
SYSTEM, ¶¶ 5.65-5.69 (1999)..
112. Andrew J.M. Steven, Scottish Law in a State of Reform, J. BUS. L. 177, 178 
(2002). 
113. Id. at 178-79.
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This separation between doctrinal and political property law 
reform has the effect in Scotland that the trends noted in the 
LRRS and the VGGT will be hampered in their implementation. 
The LRRS could be seen as an expression of political aspirations, 
which has little to do with the real scholarly work of private law 
which is focused on ensuring coherence, certainty and efficiency 
of the principles, rules and application of property law.114 The 
LRRS, VGGT, and reform measures such as the new community 
rights-to-buy are not seen as affecting the substantive structure 
of property law, which seemingly remains intact. The hierarchy of 
rights with ownership, in principle absolute and exclusive, at the 
top is untouched. To many, documents such as the LRRS and the 
VGGT will be regarded as not affecting the doctrine of private law 
and can therefore be safely ignored.
The separation between political and doctrinal property law 
reform has now found institutional expression after the creation 
of the Scottish Land Commission. As mentioned above, this 
Commission was established under the Land Reform (Scotland) 
Act 2016,115 and is occupied with reviewing, researching, and rec-
ommending changes to, the laws and policies relating to land in 
Scotland.116 The Scottish Land Commission’s work is under-
pinned by the LRRS and it has begun to issue a series of Proto-
cols which clarify what is reasonably expected in implementing 
the LRRS.117 In its Strategic Plan for 2018-2021, the priority are-
as for research and reform include measures to bring vacant and 
derelict land into use for housing, improving the effectiveness of 
community right-to-buy mechanisms, promoting inclusive deci-
sion-making in relation to land, and creating a better functioning 
system of tenanted agricultural land.118 These are all areas which 
have been controversial in the past and are highly politically sen-
sitive. Meanwhile, Scotland’s primary law reform body, the Scot-
114. As commented by Malcolm Combe in relation to land reform legislation, “[t]he 
“bulwark” of Scots property remains secure.” Malcolm Combe, Part 2 and 3 of the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003: A Definitive Answer to the Scottish Land Ques-
tion?, JURID. REV. 195, 225 (2006).
115. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18) §§ 4-21.
116. Id. § 22(1).
117. The first protocol was published in 2019. SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION,
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN DECISIONS RELATING TO LAND (2019). The Land Com-
missioners must have regard to the LRRS when exercising their functions. Land Re-
form (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18) § 22, ¶ (3)(a)(i).
118. SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION, MAKING MORE OF SCOTLAND’S LAND: OUR 
STRATEGIC PLAN 2018 TO 2021 13 (2018).
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tish Law Commission, is also engaged in property law reform, 
with recent projects including implied enforcement rights of title 
conditions,119 termination of commercial leases,120 and heritable 
securities.121 The LRRS is highly relevant to aspects of these pro-
jects, yet within the Scottish Law Commission’s publications, 
there has been little substantive engagement with the principles 
of the LRRS. Consequently, the work of these two institutions is 
quite separate despite them both working in the area of property 
and land law reform. This again can limit the impact of the LRRS 
due to the lack of integration of the principles into new law re-
form proposals.
A further barrier to fulfilment of the vision of the LRRS and 
the VGGT is the lack of incorporation of social, economic and cul-
tural rights into the national legal system. Scotland, unlike South 
Africa, does not have an all-encompassing constitutional dispen-
sation. In South Africa, the systemic constitutional approach was 
developed in order to give effect to the new constitutional ar-
rangement which had such wide-ranging implications on all areas 
of law.122 By contrast, private lawyers in Scotland are only just 
starting to appreciate the importance of the incorporation of the 
civil and political rights of the ECHR. Writing in 2002, Gretton 
stated:
To the private lawyer, the text of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR) comes as a shock. It is not legislation of any 
recognisable form, but rather a set of statements of certain 
liberal political ideas, of the sort one might expect to see in 
an election manifesto or in a letter to the editor.123
It is an aspect of private law methodology which constructs a rig-
id division between private and public law, which, up to now has 
119. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, SECTION 53 OF THE TITLE CONDITIONS 
(SCOTLAND) ACT 2003 (2018); SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON SECTION 53 OF 
THE TITLE CONDITIONS (SCOTLAND) ACT 2003 (2019). This latter report makes brief 
mention of the LRRS in ¶ 1.14. 
120. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, ASPECTS OF LEASES: TERMINATION (2018). 
121. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, HERITABLE SECURITIES: PRE-DEFAULT (2019). 
Again, this Discussion Paper makes brief mention of the LRRS at ¶ 12.19. Again, 
this Discussion Paper makes brief mention of the LRRS at ¶ 12.19, note 21.
122. See infra Section IV.
123. George L. Gretton, Property Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCOTS LAW 275 
(2002).
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been difficult to pierce.124 Indeed, as mentioned above, the focus 
has been primarily on understanding the effect of Art 1, Pro 1 on 
property law reform, and this has largely been characterised as a 
shield against reform.125
When discussing the implementation of social, economic, and 
cultural rights in Scotland, Boyle provocatively asks: “Why would 
public lawyers concern themselves with the full breadth of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights if the domestic system has not 
incorporated them? Why seek to invoke international instru-
ments in court that have not been incorporated into domestic 
law?”126 This query has even more resonance with private law-
yers. The lack of direct incorporation of economic, social and cul-
tural rights in Scotland means that, although legislative pro-
posals, government policies and practices may be nested within a 
broad conception of human rights, if a land reform provision is 
challenged in court, on the basis of being in contravention with 
Art 1, Pro 1 of the ECHR, there could not be a direct rebuttal 
based on the argument that the legislation is contributing to the 
realization of a right to an adequate standard of living. The ar-
gument could only be that a land reform provision is compliant 
with Art 1, Pro 1 due to being in the “public interest,” with social, 
economic, and cultural rights being used to interpret that re-
quirement.127
Nevertheless, Boyle states direct incorporation is only one 
method of implementation of human rights, which can take many 
forms including pre-legislative scrutiny of legislation as well as 
making economic, social and cultural rights part of the everyday 
124. The division between public law and private law is connected to the division 
between doctrinal and political law reform. Morton J. Horwitz, History of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982): “What were the con-
cerns that created a virtual obsession with separating public and private law, both 
conceptually and practically, during the nineteenth century? Above all was the effort 
of orthodox judges and jurists to create a legal science that would sharply separate 
law from politics.”
125. See supra Section II.B. 
126. Katie Boyle, The Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Scotland,
23 EDIN. L. REV. 110, 110 (2019). See also Katie Boyle, Model of Incorporation and 
Justiciability for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, SCOTTISH HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION (Nov. 2018), https://www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1809/models_
of_incorporation_escr_vfinal_nov18.pdf; KATIE BOYLE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS LAW: INCORPORATION, JUSTICIABILITY AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION
(2020).
127. See McCarthy, supra note 16, 232-235. 
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decision-making of the executive.128 In relation to land reform, 
Scotland has made important steps towards this implementation 
by requiring consideration of social, economic and cultural rights 
in preparing the LRRS. Consideration of such rights is also pre-
sent in the work of the Scottish Land Commission.129 Boyle there-
fore concludes: “The questions that remain outstanding are not 
whether ESC rights are justiciable but relate to how to adjudicate 
these rights in a constitutionally appropriate way in any given 
context.”130 In other words, economic, social and cultural rights 
are already relevant, but there has not been sufficient attention 
given to how to mainstream the consideration and implementa-
tion of these rights into reform measures, policies and, of course, 
academic research and legal practice. We will consider how social, 
economic, and cultural rights may be relevant in a concrete case 
in section V below.
The ambiguity of the implementation of social, economic, cul-
tural and also environmental rights has been at the core of a re-
cent report to Scotland’s First Minister from the Advisory Group 
on Human Rights Leadership.131 This report proposes a new 
framework of human rights implementation with the value of 
human dignity at its core.132 The report recommends a new Act of 
the Scottish Parliament which would not only restate the civil
and political rights contained in the Human Rights Act 1998, but 
also directly incorporate economic, social and cultural rights, in-
cluding a right to a healthy environment.133 It is stated that the 
Act must include an obligation on courts and tribunals to have 
regard to international law including UN treaties as well as an 
obligation to read legislation as far as possible in a way which is 
compatible with the rights contained in the Act.134 Remedies for 
128. Katie Boyle, The Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Scotland: 
Prospects for Meaningful Enforcement, 23 EDIN. L. REV. 110, 111-12 (2019).
129. See also Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 98, ¶ 5A, which requires 
that Ministers have regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights when making decisions under specific sections of that Act. This sec-
tion was added by the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, (ASP 6) sch. 4, 
¶ 8, ¶ 6(b). 
130. Boyle, supra note 128.
131. FIRST MINISTER’S ADVISORY GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE PEOPLE’S
LIVES, (2018).
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 32-35.
134. Id. at 34.
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infringement of human rights are included in the report with 
both the “declaration of incompatibility” and the “strike down” 
power being discussed.135 It is clear then, that a stronger form of 
justiciability of social, economic, cultural and environmental 
rights is being recommended. This would change the significant 
asymmetry in the enforceability of civil and political rights as op-
posed to social, economic, and cultural rights which currently ex-
ists in Scotland. The First Minister has stated that she will set up 
a taskforce in order to take forward the recommendations in the 
Report.136 It is therefore becoming ever more important to consid-
er social, economic, cultural and environmental rights in the con-
stellation of human rights considerations and how this affects re-
form, research and practice in each individual area of law. With 
the broad consequences that property law can have, scrutiny of 
this area of law cannot be excluded.
In order to implement a broader consideration of human 
rights in the context of property law, and to implement the other 
elements of the LRRS and VGGT, such as placing property within 
a system of values, the private law methodology of Scotland re-
quires revision. Indeed, for one trained in the methodology of pri-
vate law, even if sympathetic to the cause of land reform, it is dif-
ficult to know how to use and analyze documents such as the 
LRRS. McCarthy, when writing a blog on the LRRS, states:
I tend to respond to consultations with my legal academic hat 
on, meaning that I am using my disciplinary training to iden-
tify potential legal problems with the topic of the consulta-
tion, rather than giving a personal opinion on whether the 
Government should be trying to do what it’s doing. That ap-
proach leaves me with little to say on the LRRS since, as far 
as I can see, it has almost no legal consequences at all.137
McCarthy notes that she does not see this as a problem and that 
clarifying the Government’s policy ambitions shines a light on the 
135. Id. at 34-35.
136. See announcement made on Dec. 12, 2018:  https://firstminister.gov.scot
/human-rights-day/)..
137. Frankie McCarthy, Scotland’s Land Rights & Responsibilities Statement – not 
a legal document, FRANKIE MCCARTHY, A BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017): 
https://drfmccarthy.wordpress.com/2017/02/26/scotlands-land-rights-responsibilities-
statement-not-a-legal-document/. Combe agrees with McCarthy’s analysis. See Mal-
colm Combe, Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement: A Consultation Response,
MALCOLM COMBE, BASE DRONES (Mar. 9, 2017): https://basedrones.wordpress.com/
2017/03/09/land-rights-and-responsibilities-statement-a-consultation-response/.
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values of property law. This is a positive step, but the question 
remains: What is the meaning and import of this expression of 
values on our approach to property law?138 Our argument here is 
that barriers in private law methodology can limit the potential of 
documents such as the LRRS and the VGGT as well as the capac-
ity of researchers to make use of them. This approach to doctrinal 
property law is not limited only to Scotland.139 As commented by 
Verstappen: “The societal issues surrounding property rights in 
general and land in particular are much broader than a lawyer 
with a typical private law background could possibly think.”140
In this section, we have outlined certain features of private 
law methodology and the legal system in Scotland, which may 
limit the implementation of the vision contained in the LRRS and 
the VGGT. The division between political and doctrinal law re-
form measures was identified as a feature that avoids interfer-
ence with the hierarchy of rights and principle of absolute and ex-
clusive ownership. A strict division between public law and 
private law, and the lack of direct incorporation of social, econom-
ic, and cultural rights into the Scottish legal system were also 
identified as barriers to fulfilment of the aspirations of the LRRS 
and VGGT. In the next section, we explore the development of the 
systemic constitutional approach which emerged in South Africa 
after the end of Apartheid. We argue that the South African ex-
perience sheds light on the ongoing process of land reform in 
Scotland and more broadly how this relates to the regulation of 
property in the context of sustainability. The development of 
South Africa’s post-Apartheid property law highlights how prob-
lematic adherence to these aspects of private law methodology 
can be when it marginalizes pressing social issues.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. BACKGROUND
Given South Africa’s socio-political history, it was clear dur-
ing the negotiations for a peaceful transition to a new democratic 
regime that large-scale reforms of the property system would be 
138. McCarthy subsequently uses the publication of the LRRS as offering an ap-
propriate moment for reflection on how Art 1, Pro 1 of the ECHR has been used in 
the context of the land reform debates. See supra note 16, at 232-35.
139. See VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, 18-19.
140. Verstappen, supra note 80, at 98.
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needed to successfully facilitate meaningful socio-economic trans-
formation.141 Immediately, issues of land reform, including resti-
tution, redistribution and tenure security, were identified as be-
ing of paramount importance in relation to the transformation of 
the existing property system.142 These commitments were set out 
in section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996.143 However, the vision of section 25 of the Constitution ex-
141. For a succinct overview of the revolutionary nature of the South African Con-
stitution, see Introduction to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS HANDBOOK 2-7 (2013), and the works cited there.
142. See e.g., Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993; Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994; Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; Extension of Se-
curity of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 
63 of 1997; Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 18 of 1998; Preven-
tion of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. See al-
so JUANITA M. PIENAAR, LAND REFORM 173-190 (2014).
143. § 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is the property 
clause and reads: 
1. No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general appli-
cation, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
2. Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application—
a. for a public purpose or in the public interest; and
b. subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner 
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or de-
cided or approved by a court.
3. The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must 
be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public in-
terest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant cir-
cumstances, including—
a. the current use of the property;
b. the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
c. the market value of the property;
d. the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and
e. the purpose of the expropriation.
4. For the purposes of this section—
a. the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, 
and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s nat-
ural resources; and
b. property is not limited to land.
5. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access 
to land on an equitable basis.
6. A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent pro-
vided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress.
7. A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a re-
sult of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress.
8. No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and 
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress 
the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from 
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tended well beyond land reform. It included all forms of property 
within its ambit144 and made clear that all property was held sub-
ject to the possibility of constitutionally-valid deprivation.145 Sec-
tion 25 thus created the possibility for new and potentially more 
extensive regulation of property rights in pursuit of constitutional 
objectives.146 The Constitution, especially section 25, and its ap-
proach to the protection and regulation of property attempted to 
mediate the tension between the need for change147 and a need 
for stability within property law.148
the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 
36(1).
9. Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).
S. AFR. CONST. § 25, 1996.
144. Textually, § 25, ¶ 4(b) only indicates that “property” is not limited to land, but 
no definition is provided. However, since then, the Constitutional Court on numerous 
occasions has taken a generous approach to what will be included in the constitu-
tional notion of property. In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v. Member of the Exec. Coun-
cil for Econ. Dev., Envtl. Affairs and Tourism, E. Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 
(CC) ¶ 36 (S. Afr.), Froneman, J. stressed that it is necessary to “seek our own consti-
tutional conception of property within the normative framework of the fundamental 
values and individual rights in the Constitution.”
145. In South African law, “deprivation” is the broader term used to refer to all 
types of regulation imposed on all types of property on the basis of the State’s police 
power, while the narrower term “expropriation” is used to denote the taking away of 
private property by the state for a public purpose or in the public interest. The two 
types of State action are authorized by separate constitutional provisions (§ 25, ¶ 1
and § 25, ¶ 2 respectively), but deprivation has been interpreted so widely as to en-
compass the narrower category of expropriation within its ambit. See ANDRE J. VAN 
DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW 190-192 (2011); BJÖRN HOOPS, THE 
LEGITIMATE JUSTIFICATION OF EXPROPRIATION: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS 375 (2017).
146. This was confirmed by Madlanga, J. in Daniels v. Scribante and Another 2017 
(4) SA 341 (CC) ¶ 49 (S. Afr.) where the Court held that where tenure security is at 
stake, both positive and negative obligations are imposed on private landowners to 
ensure the realization of others’ constitutional rights (which includes the right of se-
curity of tenure and the right to dignity in the particular matter).
147. In the face of growing political pressure to “open up” property to groups who 
have previously been excluded based on racially discriminatory policies. See e.g.,
Theunis Roux, Continuity and Change in a Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution on South African Law, 121 S. AFRICAN L.J. 466, 467 
(2004). Underkuffler’s characterization of the tension between the “idea of change” 
and “the idea of property” aptly describes the same tension that exists in South Afri-
can law. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Co-
nundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015 (2013) (“The core difficulty, I shall argue, is the colli-
sion of the idea of property with the idea of change. It is the inability of the Court to 
intellectually reconcile the incompatibility of the ideas of property and change-
indeed, to acknowledge the problem of property and change-that lies at the core of its 
incoherent takings jurisprudence.”).
148. In light of South Africa’s commitment of “transformative constitutionalism”, 
there was a commitment to protect existing or vested property rights to stabilize the 
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Initially, many private law academics were sceptical of the 
impact of these reforms on private law and preferred to leave it to 
public law lawyers to carve out “pockets” of reform.149 These 
“pockets” allowed for interpretation and application of reform-
orientated legislation without affecting the structure and logic of 
property law,150 essentially continuing to respect a strict divide 
drawn between private law and public law.151 Many significant 
changes were introduced by legislation, but these pockets of re-
form were seen to be carved out of “normal” property law – mean-
ing that property law continued to exist in its common law 
form,152 but with areas such as the landlord-tenant relationship, 
minerals, water, environmental regulation, and land use man-
agement increasingly regulated through statute.153 Changes with-
in property law were fairly limited when not introduced by legis-
economy during this time of transition. On this dichotomy, see André J. van der Walt, 
Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term, 1 Const. CT. REV.
77, 84-85; 91-92 (2008).
149. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
150. This development was in part caused by the “dual apex system” that was ini-
tially in place in South Africa: the (then newly-created) Constitutional Court would 
be the highest authority on constitutional matters and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
would retain its authority over “all other matters.” This structure was eventually 
changed through the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 72 of 2012.
151. Frank I. Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Con-
stitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA Vol. 1,, 11.2 (2nd ed. 2005); S
LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTION 59 (2010). Although the divide formally still exists in South African 
law, the boundaries are becoming less and less clear in many areas of law. See Andre 
J. van der Walt, The Public Aspect of Private Property, 19:3 SA PUB. L. 676, 696-98
(2004); JOHAN VAN DER WALT, THE FUTURE AND FUTURITY OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION IN THE VIEW OF THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 115-16, 124-133 (2002).
152. See e.g., the detailed overview of legal developments Susan Scott, Recent De-
velopments in Case Law regarding Neighbour Law and Its Influence on the Concept of 
Ownership, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 351, 351-377 (2005), where nuisance, en-
croachment, access rights, and the right to a view are set out. From the discussion it 
is evident that constitutional considerations are of no or little importance to legal de-
velopments in these fields. It remains almost exclusively matters of common law 
(private law). In the context of nuisance caused by “squatters” (Scott’s term), Scott 
merely mentions that while it should be dealt with as a normal nuisance situation, a 
judge, when making his order, should take heed of the procedural protection offered 
to illegal occupiers in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
153. See e.g., Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999; Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 
of 1997; Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 
of 1998; Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; South Afri-
can National Water Act 36 of 1998; National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998.
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lation.154 Many private law specialists engaged with constitution-
al and legislative reform measures, but they focused on “whether 
(and how far) established property rights could (and should) be 
insulated against political changes.”155 This position meant that 
there was no uniform understanding of what the impact of the 
Constitution would be on private property rights, nor what “out-
come,” in terms of the Constitution’s influence, was desirable.156
Moreover, it was not clear how previously non-justiciable values 
such as equality, dignity or freedom would be incorporated into 
the established logic of private law doctrine that was primarily 
aimed at promoting and protecting certainty and efficiency within 
the system.157
Van der Walt extensively argued that the traditional private 
law approach of the “rights paradigm,” with a hierarchy of rights 
in which ownership is the so-called “trump-all” right,158 was ill-
suited to give effect to a new understanding of constitutionally-
protected property rights and what this would mean in the South 
African context.159 The hierarchy-of-rights logic (which Scotland 
and South Africa share) allows for primarily abstract, syllogistic 
reasoning in property disputes.160 Consequently, little or no value 
or attention is given to any relevant contextual factors, such as 
the historical, economic, social, or political context surrounding a 
dispute or the personal circumstances of the parties.161 This ap-
154. André J. van der Walt, Ownership and Eviction: Constitutional Rights in Pri-
vate Law, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 32 (2004); André J. van der Walt, Legal History, Le-
gal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy, 12 FUNDAMINA 1
(2006).
155. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
156. For a succinct overview of the academic debates at the time, see VAN DER
WALT, supra note 7, at 1-8.
157. See generally VAN DER WALT, supra note  52, at 27-41 (discussing the doctri-
nal framework within which property interests are traditionally considered).
158. Id.; Andre J. van der Walt, Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-
Law Tradition in South African Property Law, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 169 (1995); 
ANDRE J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 113-171 (2012).
159. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 20 (highlighting the tension between “a 
moral and political impulse to reform and a cultural or doctrinal tendency to resist or 
minimise change.”).
160. Id. at 27-28 (2009).
161. Id. Although Van der Walt writes extensively on the position in South African 
legal doctrine and theory, he points out that the hierarchical ordering of property 
rights occurs in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Id. at 28. He argues 
that the features of both systems that allow for this hierarchical approach to proper-
ty rights stem from socio-political and socio-economic assumptions and rhetoric about 
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proach to property disputes would not realize any of the trans-
formative outcomes that the Constitution set out to achieve and 
would eventually undermine the peaceful political settlement and 
fail to create any real long-term stability and security in socie-
ty.162
This resistance of property law to adapt fundamentally to 
the challenges posed by the new constitutional dispensation was 
directly addressed in Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Devel-
opment.163 The Constitutional Court had to decide whether liquor 
licenses constituted “property” for constitutional purposes (and 
thus were worthy of constitutional protection) and, if liquor li-
censes did constitute property, whether the regulatory regime 
change that did away with an entire type of license constituted an 
arbitrary deprivation of that property.164 In a somewhat compli-
cated division of the bench, three judgments were written by Jus-
tice Froneman, Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, and Justice 
Madlanga, respectively, which speaks to the contentious relation-
ship between property and regulation.165 At the heart of all three 
judgments is the question of how economic interests fit into a 
the importance of property (both for individuals and for society) rather than from le-
gal tradition or doctrine. Id.
162. See VAN DER WALT,  supra note 52, at 6 (arguing that the peaceful political 
settlement in South Africa can only bring lasting security and stability if accompa-
nied by significant social and economic transformation).
163. Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd. v. Member of the Exec. Council for Econ. Dev., En-
vtl. Affairs and Tourism, E. Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at ¶ 34 (S. Afr.) 
(acknowledging “the contested nature of our country’s conversation about the protec-
tion of property and the potential danger this holds for the success of our constitu-
tional project.”) [hereafter Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development]. Van 
der Sijde, supra note 8, at 130, 138, 208-09, 280-82; Reconsidering the Relationship 
Between Property and Regulation: A Systemic Constitutional Approach, 130, 138, 
208-09, 280-82 (2015) (unpublished LL.D. dissertation, Stellenbosch University)
(highlighting the tension between traditional property rights and regulation of the 
economy in the public interest).
164. Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development at ¶ 1.
165. The matter was heard by eleven justices in total. The majority on the legal 
question of whether liquor licenses constituted “property” that stood to be protected 
by § 25 of the Constitution was made up of the judgments of Froneman, J. (with 
three justices concurring) and Madlanga, J. (with one justice concurring). Madlanga. 
J.’s judgment agrees that liquor licenses are property but disagreed with Froneman, 
J. on whether the regulatory regime change amounted to an arbitrary deprivation. 
Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development at ¶ 5.  Id. The Moseneke, D.C.J. 
judgment (with four justices concurring) disagrees that the interest amounts to a 
property right, but agrees that the regulatory measure passes constitutional muster. 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd. v. Member of the Exec. Council for Econ. Dev., Envtl. Af-
fairs and Tourism, E. Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at ¶ 5 (S. Afr.).
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democratic legal system that is committed to promoting dignity, 
equality, and freedom. Moseneke, D.C.J., in his concurrence, 
questioned whether certain economic interests ought to be in-
cluded in the definition of “property” for purposes of section 25. In 
fact, Moseneke, D.C.J. perfectly captured the problem that arises 
when the traditional view of property is protected too strongly in 
times of transformation. He stated:
If a liquor licence is seen as “property” then a strong entitle-
ment is created in the hands of the licence holder. This would 
tip the scales and arguably diminish the ability of the Legis-
lature to effectively regulate an industry where regulation is 
of paramount importance. Whether a liquor licence should 
constitute “property” should never be decided in a vacuum. 
The form that the permission and its regulation takes is al-
ways contingent on changing norms and policy positions. 
These norms would include where, when and what alcohol 
may be traded.166
Moseneke, D.C.J. is expressing the concern that when an interest 
is viewed as “property,” it can become insulated against (even le-
gitimate) democratic control, and a fear that a vested interest can 
only be regulated in light of “changing norms and policy posi-
tions” under the most radical of circumstances.167 Even then, an 
interference with the vested interest will have to be justified and 
likely will be interpreted to interfere as little as possible with the 
rights of the owners. While this strong position of protection safe-
guards an individual against arbitrary government action, it can 
make property rights unresponsive to democratic change.168
The purpose of section 25(1) was to make sure that all prop-
erty is responsive to reform measures,169 although it has not al-
ways succeeded in doing so.170 The main judgment of Froneman, 
166. Id. at ¶ 120 (Mosenake, D.C.J., concurring).
167. Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development at ¶¶ 115, 120, 125 
(Moseneke, D.C.J., concurring).
168. See Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 204-08, 280-84 (2015).
169. For a detailed discussion on the purpose(s) of the property clause in the South 
African Constitution, see VAN DER WALT, supra note 145, at 16-55.
170. Consider, for instance, Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v. Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 
468 (W) 475 ¶ 10 (S. Afr.) where Flemming, D.P.J. held that: 
[T]he right of ownership as recognised before the Constitution has not been af-
fected by the Constitution. Compare s 39(3) of the Constitution. No necessity 
arises to restrict rights of an owner against an illegal occupier to “promote the 
values that underlie” the Constitution or to “promote the spirit purport and ob-
jects of the Bill of Rights”. . . . Similar to the inflatable ball, ownership still re-
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J. in Shoprite takes the view that if an appropriate balance can-
not be struck between stability and reform, it would endanger the 
ultimate success of the entire peaceful democratic transition.171
Froneman, J. held:
The question of property is fiercely contested in South Afri-
can society. There is, as yet, little common ground on how we 
conceive of property under section 25 of the Constitution, 
why we should do so, and what purpose the protection of 
property should serve. This exposes a potential fault line that 
may threaten our constitutional project. This judgment sug-
gests that our evolving conversation on this issue should con-
tinue to seek our conception of property within the frame-
work of values and individual rights in the Constitution.172
And later:
All property is subject to the law and regulation by the law. 
In that wide sense, the holding of all property is dependent 
on state “largesse”. The intensity of regulation may depend 
on the purpose for which the property is held and the purpose 
for which regulation is considered necessary. The purpose for 
which property is held may have a close relationship with a 
person’s fundamental rights. That may, in general, require 
greater judicial scrutiny of its regulation. A more tenuous 
link may justify less intrusion.173
The majority of the Court concluded that section 25 of the 
Constitution could be applied in a context-sensitive manner that 
avoids the pitfalls of overinflating the property concept and 
shielding it too carefully from regulation.174 It thus recognized 
liquor licenses as property (setting the scene for other licenses 
and similar economic interests to be recognised and protected as 
property) and scrutinized whether the regulatory regime change
flates to its full content as and when any burden such as the rights created by 
tenancy falls away. In the absence of legislative interference, postulating that 
nothing more is known than that the plaintiff is owner and that the defendant is 
in possession, it is right and proper that an owner be granted an ejectment order 
against someone who has no business interfering with the possession.
171. Shoprite Checkers v. ME, Economic Development at ¶ 4.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at ¶. 60.
174. Id. at ¶¶ 46-51.
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amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property.175 The majority 
found that the regulation passed constitutional muster.176 It is 
striking how the main, concurring, and dissenting judgments in 
Shoprite Checkers v MEC, Economic Development are concerned 
with how property and its regulation fit into the bigger constitu-
tional legal system.177 The main and concurring judgments also 
illustrate two potential responses to the fear that existing protec-
tion for established or vested rights may undermine democratic 
reform initiatives.178 Thus, the dispute perfectly captured the sys-
temic importance of the relationship between our understanding 
of property and the role of democratic control over property. If the 
effect of the constitutional protection of an entitlement as “prop-
erty” is to shield it from legitimate State control, the effect is a 
skewed concept that unjustifiably prioritizes private interests 
above the public interest.179
B. TWO SENSES OF SUSTAINABILITY
Addressing the role and importance of property within a con-
stitutional legal order in South Africa is linked to sustainability 
in two senses. Firstly, sustainability refers to the continuation of 
the legitimacy of the property system within the broader constitu-
tional legal system.180 Due to the historical, socio-economic, and 
political context in South Africa, for the property regime to be 
“sustainable,” it is crucial that inequality and other socio-
economic challenges be addressed.181 The need for real transfor-
175. Id. at ¶¶ 70, 83 (assuming diamond dealer licenses were property for constitu-
tional purposes); S. Afr. Diamond Producers Org. v. Minister of Minerals and Energy 
N.O. and Others 2017 (6) SA 331 (CC) at ¶ 57 (S. Afr.).
176. Id. at ¶¶ 83, 90.
177. Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development at ¶ 4, 103 (Moseneke, 
D.C.J., concurring), 138-39 (Madlanga, J., dissenting).
178. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 95, 130, 204-08, 280-84, 291-93, 299; see also 
Shoprite Checkers v. MEC, Economic Development at ¶¶ 46, 103 (Moseneke, D.C.J., 
concurring).
179. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 212-13.
180. Here, “legitimacy” refers to the enhanced democratic legitimacy provided 
through participatory policy-making mentioned above, which focuses on procedural 
legitimacy (see supra Sections II.B and II.C above) and substantive legitimacy, in the 
sense that the outcomes of the transformative process match the goals of the trans-
formation. It touches on some aspects of John Rawls’ concept of political legitimacy 
as it has been developed in, for example, JOHN RAWLS, Introduction to the Paperback 
Edition, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxxv-lx; (1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 372-439 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED
(1971).
181. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 6.
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mation remains evident; without actual social and economic 
transformation that provides tangible benefits to the poor and 
marginalized, the system will become increasingly unstable and 
lose any claim to legitimacy.182 For example, if the pressure of in-
equality becomes too great, it may lead to social unrest or, in ex-
treme cases, even civil war.183 If the resistance to transformation 
is institutionalized (as a stand-off between a reform-orientated 
parliament and a conservative/anti-reform judiciary), it may lead 
to constitutional amendments that lessen existing constitutional 
protection.184 This transformation will necessarily require some 
degree of short-term instability in the context of existing property 
rights, but without the concomitant upheaval that results from 
genuine doctrinal, theoretical, and methodological changes need-
ed to reflect and respond to the reform measures, no real or sus-
tained transformation is possible.185 The commitment to trans-
formative constitutionalism remains an on-going challenge that 
straddles both political debate and legal reform.186
Most recently, political engagement has focused on whether 
transformation of landholding patterns has been slowed down by 
the demand for compensation when the State seeks to expropriate 
182. Id. at 220.
183. Consider for instance the devastating result of the Marikana miners protest-
ing the (in their view unfair) allocation of the extraordinary wealth created by min-
ing in South Africa where forty-four people were killed. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 46-80 (2014) characterizes the Marikana massacre as a 
“distributional conflict” that arose from the vast difference between the wretched liv-
ing conditions of the workers and the excessive profits taken by Lonmin Plc. 
184. Consider for example the “long and bitter struggle (1950-1978) between the 
Indian parliament and the judiciary” regarding the property clause which resulted in 
its removal from the section of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights, and 
saw it replaced with a much lesser form of protection for property (merely stating 
that deprivation of property shall not be effected by administrative decree) in a dif-
ferent section of the Indian Constitution 1950. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 7, 
note 7.
185. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 4-6 (discussing theories of change without 
disturbing existing property rights and the need for precisely such disturbance in or-
der to ensure that the new political order obtains legitimacy).
186. The term “transformative constitutionalism” was first used by Karl Klare as 
shorthand for South Africa’s commitment to using the law to transform society. See
Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON 
HUM. RTS. 146, 150 (1998), where it is explained that “transformative constitutional-
ism” means the “long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed . . . to transforming a country’s political and social institu-
tions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direc-
tion.” See also Dennis M. Davis & Karl Klare, Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Common and Customary Law, 26 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 403, 404 (2010).
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land.187 This debate shows that the exact scope and extent of re-
form measures that is required to create an equitable and sus-
tainable legal system is not decided in a one-off manner; rather, it 
is a highly dynamic and contextual process that continuously 
evaluates whether the property system is producing outcomes 
that are in line with the values of the broader constitutional legal 
system.
Secondly, South Africa is also actively engaging in creating a 
legal framework to promote and facilitate sustainable develop-
ment.188 Pressing environmental concerns have come to the fore-
front in South African property law and demand attention con-
currently with socio-economic transformation initiatives. With 
national and international commitments to sustainable develop-
ment, South Africa can hardly afford to wait to resolve its Apart-
heid-inherited challenges regarding inequality before responding 
to the environmental crisis. Sustainability, in this context (which 
is perhaps more familiar), refers to meeting the needs of the pre-
sent without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.189 South Africa’s vision of sustainable de-
velopment is stated as follows:
South Africa aspires to be a sustainable, economically pros-
perous and self-reliant nation state that safeguards its de-
mocracy by meeting the fundamental human needs of its 
people, by managing its limited ecological resources respon-
sibly for current and future generations, and by advancing ef-
ficient and effective integrated planning and governance 
through national, regional and global collaboration.190
Achieving sustainability in both respects touches on the theoreti-
cal and methodological shifts needed in private law doctrine to 
support large-scale transformation. Thus, the next section dis-
187. See e.g., Nkanyiso Sibanda, Amending Section 25 of the South African Consti-
tution to Allow for Expropriation of Land Without Compensation 35 S. AFRICAN J. ON 
HUM. RTS., 129-146 (2019) for an overview of the continuing nature of the political 
and legal engagement with the land reform process.
188. South Africa has adopted progressive environmental legislation in line with its 
constitutional obligation in § 24 of the Constitution, that guarantees the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing and to have the envi-
ronment protected for the benefit of present and future generations. 
189. This definition being adapted from the definition of sustainable development 
in WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987).
190. DEP’T OF ENV’T AFF. & TOURISM, PEOPLE-PLANET-PROSPERITY: A NATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 8 (2008).
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cusses the most influential example in South Africa of such a 
shift. Van der Walt’s theory regarding the modest systemic posi-
tion of property rights shows the dynamic nature of the property 
system. Moreover, it offers a useful theoretical and methodologi-
cal framework in which to situate property rights vis-à-vis other 
rights and interests, in a manner that supports and promotes 
property rights’ responsiveness to democratic reforms.
C. THE MODEST SYSTEMIC STATUS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Van der Walt, in his seminal article concerning the limited 
systemic role that property rights play in the legal system, ex-
plores the appropriate place of property in the constitutional con-
text and develops a view of property’s role in relation to the right 
to “life, dignity, equality, free movement, free speech or assem-
bly.”191 His theory is both descriptive and normative, showing 
that in case law, non-property rights are often prioritized above 
property rights, but that this prioritization is justifiable in light 
of the social or democratic importance of the non-property 
right.192 Thus, there are important systemic, constitutional rea-
sons for this structure of prioritization.193
According to Van der Walt’s theory, the pre-eminence of 
property rights is not always justifiable or even appropriate de-
spite property’s esteemed status as protecting individual liber-
ty.194 Non-property rights should be protected in their own right 
where possible, rather than doing so through property rights.195
This approach counteracts an “over-inflation” of the property no-
tion.196 When property is allegedly protected to at least partially 
guarantee or protect other non-property rights, the importance of 
property protection becomes overemphasized.197 In a legal sys-
tem, the institution of private property will often clash with the 
promotion of other rights, objectives or values, and property 
191. VAN DE Walt, supra note 6, 27-29.
192. Id. at 29-30
193. See id., where it is argued that in certain cases property rights yield (and in 
fact ought to yield) to other, non-property constitutional rights, because of the “sys-
temic importance” of the non-property right(s).
194. Id. 32-33.
195. Id. at 31.
196. Id. at 25.
197. See id. at 34-35 (responding to James W. Ely’s contention in JAMES W. ELY,
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2nd ed. 1998)).
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rights may have to give way to systemically more important 
rights, objectives or values.198 Van der Walt’s analysis specifically 
deals with the right to life, human dignity, equality,199 free 
speech, and assembly rights, and evaluates the role of property in 
relation to these fundamentally important human rights.200 He 
shows that the methodology employed is often not one of balanc-
ing, but rather evaluating the role and purpose of each right, and 
protecting these rights in relation to the fundamental values of 
the legal system.201 Van der Walt concludes that:
[P]roperty rights are not the condition on which democracy 
depends; instead, they are circumscribed, defined, by the de-
mands of living in a democratic society – the structure of our 
democracy is the condition for and the guarantee of property 
rights. Protecting property rights is a legitimate objective of 
the legal order, but relative to the primary norms that pre-
scribe how we want to live in society it is a systemically mod-
est one.202
Van der Walt’s “modest systemic status” approach fits in neatly 
with the work he had done previously on the development of the 
unity of the legal system.203 The “single-system-of-law” principle 
was first set out by the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others204
when the Court stated: “There is only one system of law. It is 
shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, 
including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution 
and is subject to constitutional control.”205
In this case, Chaskalson P., writing for the full bench, had to 
address the question of the courts’ powers to review (and possibly 
set aside) the decision of the President of the country to bring 
198. Id. at 43.
199. These three rights are the so-called “immutable rights” in the South African 
Constitution. See id. at 45.
200. Id. at 62 (categorizing these rights as “other constitutionally stronger non-
property rights.”).
201. See id. at 51.
202. Id. at 102.
203. ANDRE J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 19-184 (2012).
204. Pharm. Mfr. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. In re The President of the Republic of S. Afr.
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at 36-44(S. Afr.).
205. Id. at 44.
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democratically-enacted legislation into force.206 To found the ju-
risdiction of the Constitutional Court, Chaskalson P. had to ad-
dress the following contention: if the question was whether the 
President acted ultra vires by signing into force an Act of Parlia-
ment before the accompanying regulations were ready, that 
would render the finding by the court a quo a common law find-
ing, since the doctrine of ultra vires already existed under the 
common law, long before the dawn of the new constitutional era 
in South Africa.207
Chaskalson P. refused to accept the argument that grounds 
of review which existed under the common law would continue to 
exist separate and distinct from the Constitution.208 He held that 
all exercises of public power were subject to the Constitution, 
which includes the doctrine of legality (and concomitantly the 
prohibition against ultra vires actions) and therefore constituted 
a “constitutional matter” for jurisdictional purposes.209 Thus, 
while the case dealt with the exercise of public power and judicial 
review, it had special implications for the development of proper-
ty law in the constitutional era because it too was an area of law 
where many citizens, lawyers, and judges would have preferred 
for parts of the common law to continue to exist “separate and 
distinct” from the influences of the Constitution.210
This judgment was the impetus for a complete re-evaluation 
of how different areas of law would be affected by the transforma-
206. Id. at 1-2.
207. Id. at 14-21. This was the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in 
an earlier decision, Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Container Logistics (Pty) 
Ltd; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight 1999
(3) SA 771 (SCA) (S. Afr.), wherein the SCA found it “unnecessary” to refer to the 
provisions of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 
(which was applicable at the time) because the common law concept of judicial review 
was sufficient reason to set the particular decision aside. See Pharm. Mfr. Ass’n of S. 
Afr. v. In re The President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at 27-33.
Finally, it should be noted that, at the time that this case was before the Court, 
South Africa still endorsed a dual-apex system of courts, which meant that the Con-
stitutional Court only had jurisdiction over constitutional matters, while the Su-
preme Court of Appeal remained the highest court of appeal over “other,” notably 
common law, matters. See supra note 150 (stating that this structure was abandoned 
through constitutional amendment in the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 
72 of 2012).
208. Pharm. Mfr. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. In re The President of the Republic of S. Afr.
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at 36-44 (S. Afr.).
209. Id. at 14-20.
210. Id. at 36-44.
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tive power of the Constitution. According to Van der Walt, what 
became known as “the single-system-of-law principle” had an im-
portant impact on two aspects of South African law.211 First, it 
clarified the hierarchy between the various sources of law by 
making all sources of law fully subject to the Constitution.212 Sec-
ond, the single-system-of-law principle also “shifted the debate” 
when it came to addressing the conflict between reform and pro-
tection of the property regime.213 Thus, the binary mind-set of ei-
ther reforming property rights or protecting them was done away 
with. Instead, both the protection of existing property rights and 
reform initiatives had to promote the same objective; the ad-
vancement of the spirit, purport, and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights.214
Van der Walt’s modest systemic status theory cautions 
against placing property rights in an undue position of primacy 
within the legal system.215 He shows that both descriptively and 
normatively, there are situations where the protection of property 
rights is a secondary concern, and is only allowed to the extent 
that the primary non-property right allows for it. These scenarios 
are not exceptions, but instead point towards a more appropriate 
understanding of the role and function of property rights in the 
legal system.
D. A SYSTEMIC CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO PROPERTY AND 
REGULATION
Building on Van der Walt’s work on the modest systemic sta-
tus of property rights, together with his work on the single-
system-of-law principle,216 Van der Sijde argues for the reconsid-
eration of the relationship between property and regulation. This 
reconsideration is necessitated by the finding that the two exist-
ing theoretical positions in private law fail to explain adequately 
the nature of limitations placed on ownership in a constitutional 
context.217 In South Africa’s pre-constitutional private law, the 
limitation or qualification of an owner’s rights by way of regulato-
ry measures imposed through statute or the common law were 
211. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 19-21.
212. Id. at 20.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 19-21.
215. Van der Walt, supra note 6, at 26-27. 
216. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 19-24.
217. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 87-92.
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understood as either inherent or external to the concept of owner-
ship.218 An absolutist view of ownership as the fullest, most com-
plete, property right, is conceptualised as a natural, pre-social 
right that is unlimited in principle.219 Limitations are imposed in 
practice, but they are “external and temporary interferences with 
an otherwise unlimited right” and the expectation is that the 
right will revert to its full, unregulated, unlimited form in time.220
In terms of the inherent-limitation view, at least some limitations 
are inherent to the individual entitlement, and ownership does 
not exist in a truly absolute form in practice or in theory.221
This inherent/external question regarding the nature of limi-
tations is discussed in private law theory because of the underly-
ing assumptions and logic of the hierarchy of rights that is cen-
tral to the Roman Dutch private law system.222 In Scotland, 
although the internal/external question has not been explored in 
detail, the external limitation view is the one that is currently 
most prevalent.223 However, both existing private law theories re-
218. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 29-32.
219. For an overview of the different meanings of “absoluteness” in South African 
law, see Andre J. van der Walt & Priviledge Dhliwayo, The Notion of Absolute and 
Exclusive Ownership: A Doctrinal Analysis, 134 S.A.L.J. 34, 49 (2017). 
220. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 11-12. This view is often explained by using the 
metaphor of an inflatable balloon that can temporarily withstand an interference, 
but will revert to its full, unlimited form in due course. See Betta Eidendomme Pty. 
Ltd. v. Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) at 475 (S. Afr.) (using this metaphor to ex-
plain the doctrinal view of ownership even after the 1996 Constitution had come into 
effect). This debate is analogous to the debate in U.S. scholarship regarding whether 
there is an essential core to property and the extent to which this core is or should be 
subject to regulation. See Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J.
L. ANALYSIS 183 (2018). Our thanks to Prof. John Lovett for bringing the similarities 
between these debates to our attention.
221. Since § 25, ¶ 1 of the Constitution clearly makes all property subject to lawful, 
legitimate (“non-arbitrary”) State action, the absolutist view has become theoretically 
unsustainable in South African law, and property is treated as being inherently lim-
ited by the potential of valid deprivation (by the State). See for instance the remarks 
by the Constitutional Court to this effect in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v. MEC 
for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Gov’t and Another 2009
(6) SA 391 (CC) ¶ 31 (S. Afr.) (“property rights under our constitutional dispensation 
cannot be properly understood outside its historical context, formulation and social 
framework”) and ¶ 34 (“However, property rights in our new constitutional democra-
cy are far from absolute; they are determined and afforded by law and can be limited 
to facilitate the achievement of important social purposes.”)
222. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 67-68, 87-92, 149-150; Van der Walt, supra
note 6; VAN DER WALT, supra note 152, at 29-31; Scott, supra note 152..
223. WILLIAM M. GORDON & SCOTT WORTLEY, SCOTTISH LAND LAW Vol. 2, ¶ 29.14 
(3rd ed. 2020). 
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garding limitation only deal with property rights as individual 
entitlements, and fail to address the systemic role and purpose of 
limitations.224 The protection, or inversely, the limitation, of indi-
vidual entitlements is only one aspect of the functioning of the 
system of private property.225 The focus on individual entitle-
ments can obscure other considerations, especially in a time of 
large-scale or fundamental transformation. Therefore, neither of 
these approaches is particularly useful when transformation of 
the larger system and its values is ongoing. Van der Sijde thus 
proposes a “systemic constitutional approach” to the regulation of 
property rights that moves away from focusing on the inher-
ent/external nature of limitations and instead, explores the im-
portant systemic purpose of regulation.226 In this view, regulation 
(or limitation) is not seen as inherent or external to an individual 
entitlement, but as inherently part of the constitutional legal sys-
tem. Accordingly, both property rights and limitations exist to-
gether within the larger legal system as two components of the 
bigger system that work together to ensure that the system can 
function effectively. This amounts to a facilitative view of the re-
lationship between property and regulation. A sustainable prop-
erty system can be achieved through regulation that promotes 
and protects the values of the broader legal system.227
Approaching the issue of democratically mandated new or 
increased regulation of property from this systemic constitutional 
point of departure allows for a more nuanced deliberation to take 
place. As Freyfogle points out: “Property’s social and moral com-
plexities have always existed, even when covered up. Surely an 
open embrace of them can yield better outcomes for all.”228 The 
value of acknowledging property’s social and moral complexities 
within its broader legal and socio-political context was evident in 
224. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 87-92.
225. Id. at 173.
226. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 18-22, 288-296.
227. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 151, 172-173, 288-296. See also JOSEPH W.
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 141 (2000); Eric T. Freyfogle, 
Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Exploratory Overview, 24 
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 430, 430-454 (2013) (discussing the idea of using property 
rights to promote human flourishing specifically with reference to the South African 
context.) A great deal of work on the development of human flourishing as justifica-
tion for private property has also been done by GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY 
AND HUMAN FLOURISHING (2018).
228. Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Exploratory 
Overview, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 430, 453 (2013).
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the 2017 decision of the South African Constitutional Court in 
Daniels v. Scribante.229 In this case, the Court was asked to give 
effect to a previously marginalized, protected-occupier’s rights in 
a situation where the occupier’s rights ran contrary to a landown-
er’s rights.230 Ms. Daniels was a single mother who had lived in a 
small dwelling for sixteen years on a farm owned by Chardonne 
Properties CC.231 The dwelling lacked basic amenities and Ms. 
Daniels sought to improve the dwelling by installing an indoor 
water supply, a washbasin, a second window and a ceiling.232 As 
the Court observed, these were by no means luxury improve-
ments, and Ms. Daniels was willing to carry the cost of the im-
provements.233 The company owning the farm prevented Ms. 
Daniels from completing the improvements.234 Consequently, Ms. 
Daniels approached the Court for a declaration to the effect that 
her statutory right to reside includes a right to make improve-
ments to the dwelling.235
Instead of merely balancing the competing interests, or start-
ing with determining the rights of the owner (as would be the 
case when either an absolute or inherently limited approach to 
ownership is adopted),236 the Court first set out the social, politi-
229. 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) (S. Afr.). The applicant, Ms. Daniels, is a protected occu-
pier in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA). ESTA 
forms part of the land reform program in South Africa that aims to improve precari-
ous tenure for farm workers and their families. For a helpful summary of the facts 
and broader implications of the case, see Juanita M. Pienaar et al., Land matters and 
rural development, 33 S. AFRICAN PUB. L. 1, 18-27 (2018); Nkanyiso Sibanda, Amend-
ing Section 25 of the South African Constitution to Allow for Expropriation of Land 
Without Compensation, 35 S. AFRICAN J. HUM. RTS. 129, 139-142 (2019). For a more 
critical discussion of the case, see e.g., Ernst J. Marais & Gustav Muller, The Right of 
an ESTA Occupier to Make Improvements Without an Owner’s Permission after Dan-
iels, 135 S. AFRICAN L. J. 767 (2018) and the response to Marais and Muller by Den-
nis M. Davis, The Right of an ESTA Occupier to Make Improvements Without an 
Owner’s Permission After Daniels: a Different Perspective, 136 S. AFRICAN L. J. 420, 
420-432 (2019).
230. Daniels v. Scribante and Another 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) ¶ 11 (S. Afr.).
231. Id. at ¶¶ 4-7. 
232. Id. at ¶¶ 4-7. It was not contested that in its unimproved condition, the dwell-
ing was not suitable for habitation and constituted an infringement of Ms. Daniels 
and her children’s rights to dignity.
233. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.
234. Id. at ¶ 9.
235. Id. at ¶ 9-10.
236. As discussed earlier, both of these approaches to ownership, while potentially 
yielding very different outcomes in regulation disputes, start with ownership at the 
front and center of a property dispute. 
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cal and historical context that led to the reform-orientated legis-
lation that afforded Ms. Daniels the right to reside.237 The Court 
sought to establish the scope and content of the rights of the mar-
ginalized rights-holder, Ms. Daniels, whose rights previously 
would have been subordinated to ownership in the rights hierar-
chy.238
The Court held that the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
1997 (ESTA) was enacted to reform tenure that was legally inse-
cure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practic-
es.239 ESTA should be interpreted to transform, in a tangible and 
substantial way, the position of people in a situation like that of 
Ms. Daniels. Thus, in a situation where the legislation is not clear 
regarding the rights and obligations of the protected occupier, 
purposive interpretation is appropriate to give effect to the trans-
formational aims of the legislation.240 Consequently, the Court 
was willing to accept that the relevant statutory provisions 
should be interpreted to include the right to make improve-
ments.241
The Court then sought to place the owner’s right in an ap-
propriate context. Owners of private property are not expected to 
take on the responsibilities of the state by upgrading dilapidated 
housing; however, they could not prevent lawful occupiers from 
effecting these improvements themselves.242 There is no justifia-
ble reason for owners to have such a power as an incident of their 
ownership right.243
237. Both the judgment of Madlanga, J. (first judgment) and Froneman, J. (second 
concurring judgment) took unusual care to set out the historical context that led to 
the applicant’s precarious situation. See Daniels v. Scribante and Another 2017 (4) 
SA 341 (CC) ¶¶ 1-4, 14-23, 109-132.
238. Consider Madlanga, J.’s framing of the issues before the court, with its focus 
on the parameters of the rights of the occupier (Ms. Daniels). See id. at ¶ 11.
239. § 25(6) of the Constitution mandates the creation of transformation-orientated 
legislation such as ESTA. See Daniels v. Scribante and Another 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) 
¶ 13.
240. Id. at ¶¶ 23-26.
241. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 71.
242. Insofar as the legislation made provision for an occupier to be compensated for 
improvements upon departure, the Court held that this was only a possibility, not a 
certainty, and a cost order would be subject to judicial oversight to ensure a fair and 
equitable balance between the parties. Id. at ¶¶ 37-58.
243. The Court briefly refers to the test in § 36 of the Constitution, the limitations 
clause, which states that the rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited by law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in 
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Finally, the Court evaluated how best to give effect to the 
competing constitutional commitments of the lawful occupier’s 
right to dignity and security of tenure vis-à-vis the landowner’s 
right to exclude.244 Even if there was a right to improve the prop-
erty, it could be made subject to the landowner’s permission and 
the landowner, by virtue of the right to exclude, could have the 
final say over which contractors (if any) could be used, and when 
such third parties may gain access to the property.245 The Court 
held that the consent of the landowner is not required, but de-
clared that there should be meaningful engagement by the occu-
pier with the owner to reconcile the rights and interests of the 
parties involved.246 This interpretation strengthened the other-
wise weak bargaining power of the occupier, while recognizing 
that no one may exercise their right in total disregard of another 
that stands to be affected by it. The owner can therefore still ap-
proach the Court for protection of their property right if the occu-
pier does not seek genuine engagement to decide when and in 
what manner the improvements should be made.247 The Court’s 
approach to the interpretation of statutory property rights result-
ed in strong, meaningful protection of the protected occupier’s 
dignity and security of tenure, and implemented genuine reform 
as envisioned by the relevant legislation.248
In 2018, the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, adopted a 
similar type of approach in investigating a community’s unique 
ties to their land, acknowledging and valuing interests in relation 
to land that previously would not have been taken into account.249
The case dealt with an Australian mining company’s bid to obtain 
a license to mine titanium in the Umgungundlovu area in South 
Africa where a community of over 600 people had lived for many 
generations.250 Beyond recognizing the burial grounds of the 
community’s ancestors as worthy of legal protection, the Court 
acknowledged the strong character of support and cooperation 
that existed within the community, and recognized the impact the 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” Id. 
at ¶ 160.
244. Id. at ¶¶ 33-36, 54
245. Id. at ¶¶ 59-60.
246. Id. at ¶¶ 59-65.
247. Id. at ¶ 65.
248. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
249. Baleni and Others v. Minister of Mineral Resources and Others 2019 (2) SA 
453 (GP) ¶¶ 7, 13, 15-17 (S. Afr.).
250. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16-20.
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mining operations would have on the social fabric of the commu-
nity.251 The Court ordered that full and informed consent from 
the community must be obtained before the Minister of Mineral 
Resources could grant a mining right, thus ensuring that the 
community is empowered to decide which interests in their land 
they wish to prioritize.252 The basis for the Court’s order was its 
findings regarding the relationship between the Mineral and Pe-
troleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (which merely re-
quires consultation with the community) and the Interim Protec-
tion of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (which requires the 
consent of the community), both of which were applicable to the 
dispute.253 The Court held that the two Acts must be read togeth-
er, and that it would best give effect to the purpose of the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to protect informal rights 
of customary communities by giving the community the right to 
decide about “what happens with their land.”254 By requiring con-
sent instead of mere consultation, the Court significantly 
strengthened the position and the rights of customary communi-
ties and recognized their close ties to their land in a real and 
meaningful manner.
To summarize, private property effectively requires at least 
some forms of regulation to exist.255 Property does not and cannot 
function in a “regulation free” zone.256 The question then becomes 
what the purpose of regulation is, what objectives it seeks to 
promote and what this means for the position of property rights 
in the legal system. Importantly, regulation is more than just the 
question of the limitation of an individual right or entitlement; it 
is a mechanism through which the broader goals, values, and ob-
jectives of the entire legal system are promoted and unwanted 
systemic effects, such as extreme wealth disparity or environmen-
tal degradation, can be minimized. Understanding regulation 
through the lens of the systemic constitutional approach high-
lights the important function that regulation fulfils within the 
251. Id. at ¶¶ 13-18.
252. Id. at ¶ 84. 
253. Id. at ¶¶ 63-84.
254. Id. at ¶ 83.
255. JOSEPH W. SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION. THE HIDDEN 
LESSONS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 2 (2015).
256. Id. at 16-17.
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broader legal context.257 Regulation recognizes and controls the 
effects that the exercise of property rights have on others, includ-
ing on marginalized communities and the environment.258 Prop-
erty law, as a social, legal, and political construct, functions with-
in a complex legal system, and we require tools to manage these 
challenges of complexity and ensure the implementation of legally 
and morally legitimate reforms.259
V. LESSONS OF THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO 
PROPERTY
A. ADOPTING A SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN SCOTLAND
In this section we consider what we can learn from the South 
African experience and what light this experience sheds on some 
of the challenges currently facing the realization of the vision 
contained in the LRRS and the VGGT in Scotland. The pedigree 
of the systemic constitutional approach is rooted within the polit-
ical, social, economic, and historical context of South Africa. Oth-
er jurisdictions may not necessarily be facing such threats to the 
sustainability of the property system, in terms of the first mean-
ing explained above, referring to the continuing legitimacy of the 
system.260 Nevertheless, the story of transformation and property 
law has larger implications. South Africa shows us how transfor-
mation can be prevented or minimized when reform is required of 
a system that is creating unjust, discriminatory, or destructive 
outcomes. This transformation is difficult because property law, 
and application of the existing private law methodology, has a 
propensity towards stability and certainty, which can be signifi-
cantly challenged in a time of greater change and transition. Alt-
hough this article is focused on Scotland and South Africa, this 
limiting feature of property can be found in other jurisdictions. 
Elements of the “Rights Paradigm” are prevalent in both Civil 
257. Elsabé van der Sijde, Tenure Security for ESTA Occupiers: Building on the 
Orbiter Remarks in Baron v. Claytile, 36 S. AFRICAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 74, 74-92
(2020).
258. See Joseph W. Singer, After the Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Re-
gimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243, 342-43 (2006).
259. Van der Sijde, supra note 8, at 251-278; VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 22-
44, 140-42.  For an in-depth argument in favor of regulation as a tool for minimizing 
unwanted system effects resulting from the exercise of property rights, see JOSEPH 
W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 7-9, 147-178 (2000).
260. But see Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847 
(2013) (analyzing the importance of resilience in a property law system).
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Law and Common Law Countries, together with the division be-
tween public law and private law.261
In the case of South Africa, the direction of transformation 
was undeniable – there was a new democratic order established 
with a constitutional framework. However, in many different con-
texts, there may be issues of pressing importance which need to 
be addressed by comprehensive measures which reform, amend 
or impact the property regime. The transition to sustainability is 
the key transformation that we focus on here, and the popular
demand for transformation, particularly in relation to the envi-
ronment, is shown by events such as millions of people participat-
ing in the international strikes and protests in September 2019 to 
demand action to address climate change262 and the establish-
ment of groups such as Extinction Rebellion263 which uses nonvio-
lent civil disobedience to compel government action regarding 
climate change and biodiversity loss. If greater regulation of 
property is required now, and will be required in the future, in 
order to achieve the aim of sustainability in the sense of meeting 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of fu-
ture generations to meet their own needs, it is important to con-
sider how to give effect to this regulation. How should reform 
measures be analyzed, how will they fit with the current property 
system and how will they contribute to addressing the challenges 
which have prompted their enactment? These are questions that 
will not be satisfactorily answered purely using private law 
methodology, which is based on the hierarchy of rights and the 
division between public law and private law, and here we argue 
that the systemic approach has value.
The South African experience shows us the importance of 
appreciating that property law operates as part of a single system 
of law. Holding fast to the existing private law methodology could 
mean that property lawyers will not engage substantively with 
reform measures designed to tackle issues of inequality or envi-
ronmental degradation, or consider human rights jurisprudence. 
261. John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances 74 TENN. L.
REV. 463, 474-476 (2007); ANDRE J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 12-52
(2009); Lynda L. Butler, Property’s Problem with Extremes 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV
1, 31-51 (2018). 
262. Sandra Laville and Jonathan Watts, Across the Globe, Millions Join Biggest 
Climate Protest Ever, The Guardian (Sept. 23, 2009): https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2019/sep/21/across-the-globe-millions-join-biggest-climate-protest-ever.
263. Extinction Rebellion: https://extinctionrebellion.uk.
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By starting with the single-system-of-law principle in Scotland, 
the distinction between political and doctrinal property law re-
forms would melt away. The measures which have been imple-
mented in order to, for example, provide access rights over pri-
vately owned land,264 provide opportunities for communities to 
force transfer of land,265 protect debtors from the enforcement of 
mortgages,266 or protect residential tenants from being evicted,267
would be seen as part of the functioning system of property, 
which is part of the broader system of law. These property law re-
forms or court decisions have clearly been implemented or decid-
ed in order to provide opportunities to share the benefits of land 
with a greater number of people or to protect those who are vul-
nerable. This view also encourages an engagement with other ar-
eas of law such as environmental law, and a consideration of how 
these rules affect our understanding and conceptualisation of 
property.
Taking this perspective means the claim that ownership is in 
principle an absolute and exclusive right becomes untenable. For 
instance, can we still insist that ownership is in principle an ab-
solute right in light of the plethora of environmental regulations 
which restrict the rights of a landowner?268 Or is the vision con-
tained in the LRRS that holders of land rights should act as 
stewards of Scotland’s land resource for future generations a 
more accurate representation of the legal framework? Can we 
still insist that ownership is an exclusive right when everyone 
has a right of responsible access over land?269
Further, this single legal system is based on certain funda-
mental rights and values. Within a constitutional arrangement, 
like South Africa, these fundamental rights and values are clear-
ly articulated.270 Otherwise, these values must be ascertained 
264. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) pt. 1.
265. Id. pts. 2, 3 and 3A; Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18), pt. 5. 
266. Mortgage Rights (Scotland) Act 2001, (ASP 11); Homeowner and Debtor Pro-
tection (Scotland) Act 2010, (ASP 6). 
267. See discussion infra Section V.B.
268. See Jill Robbie, Moving Beyond Boundaries in Pursuit of Sustainable Property
Law, in SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIVATE LAW 59 (2019).
269. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) pt. 1. See also John A. Lovett, Pro-
gressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV.
739 (2011). 
270. See S. AFR. CONST. §1, 1996 (listing, inter alia, human dignity, the achieve-
ment of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms as paramount 
founding values).
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through analysis of the legal sources which includes documents 
like the LRRS and VGGT. This is the importance of the angle of 
approach aspect of Van der Sijde’s work. The starting point of 
analysis can often determine the outcome of that analysis. Van 
der Sijde promotes starting from a position of the single system of 
law, with property and regulation as inherent parts of this sys-
tem, and with fundamental values at the core. As shown above, in 
the context of Scotland, a human rights-based approach to prop-
erty governance which includes social, economic, and cultural 
rights is becoming more pervasive – a trend which is set only to 
continue if the Advisory Group on Human Rights Leadership’s 
recommendations are implemented. Human dignity is promoted 
as being at the centre of this new framework.271 Beyond funda-
mental human rights, further values, such as sustainable devel-
opment, community empowerment and transparency are present 
in the LRRS and VGGT, as well as the general policy landscape 
in Scotland. As such, values which were previously non-
justiciable in a legal system can become central to the operation 
of the system. Van der Sijde’s analysis provides an approach 
which directs attention towards these values and creates the 
space for consideration of how these values should be operational-
ized in legal analysis. If a system which fundamentally values 
sustainable development is producing unsustainable outcomes, 
with particular property rules being a contributor to these out-
comes, this can be a lens through which one can critique those 
rules.
This raises a related point about the location and weight of 
the protection of property in a system of fundamental rights and 
values. As noted above, primacy is often accorded to property as 
protecting individual liberty.272 This promotes a view of property 
as the keystone right. There is, however, a paradox contained in 
this view, which has been discussed by Van der Walt. Due to the 
current unequal distribution of property rights, to provide every-
one with property rights will necessarily require infringements or 
amendments to existing property rights.273 A conflict has then 
been established between someone with an existing property 
right and someone with no right, in a system where property 
271. FIRST MINISTER’S ADVISORY GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP, supra
note 131, at 8..
272. See discussion supra IV.C. See also JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY 
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2nd ed. 1998). 
273. Van der Walt, supra note 6, at 31.  See also Singer, supra note 227.. 
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rights have been prioritized as a keystone right. Overcoming the 
primacy of property in this situation can be incredibly challenging 
and can take the focus away from those who are most vulnerable. 
The role of property becomes over-inflated, which again entrench-
es the position of those with property rights.274 Van der Walt ar-
gues that in order to evade this paradox, property needs to be 
placed within a broader system of values, where the needs of 
those who are vulnerable are given attention.275 We are by no
means denying that redistribution of land should be implement-
ed. Such measures can be crucial to tackling inequality or to en-
sure environmental protection. However, the prioritization of 
property protection or transfer of property rights, may not lead to 
a sufficiently comprehensive response to the complex problems 
related to property, which may require a multi-faceted remedy.276
Examples of seeing beyond the centrality of property rights in 
Scotland are providing a right of responsible access over land, or 
encouraging engagement with communities in relation to deci-
sions about land. As noted above, the protection of property does 
seem to be predominant in the VGGT, which gives rise to con-
cerns about the paradoxical status of property in that docu-
ment.277
The last lesson to be taken from the South African experi-
ence, and from this comparative exercise, is that the way property 
operates and functions in a legal system – the consequences and 
implications of property rules – is highly relevant to ongoing re-
search and reform. Due to the flexibility of the exercise of proper-
ty rights – as a tool for environmental protection or as a shield 
against protection measures; as a way to enhance the security of 
vulnerable or marginalized people and as weapon to displace 
them – it is crucial to engage with a contextual understanding of 
the operation of property within a particular setting. This in-
volves attempting to understand the social, economic, political, 
and historical background of property regimes, and allowing that 
experience to feed into the consideration of how to proceed. As 
noted by Van der Walt:
274. See Franklin Obeng-Odoom & Frank Stilwell, Security of Tenure in Interna-
tional Development Discourse, 35 INT’L DEV. PLANNING REV. 315, 318 (2013).
275. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS 231-76 (2011). 
276. Thomson et al., supra note 13, at 1-10..
277. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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[R]ecent experience shows that even lawyers and politicians 
who are in favour of significant reforms favour a forward-
looking, political approach that avoids backward-looking re-
assessment of and interference with existing rights and with 
the system of property law as such. Given the protective and 
confirming tendencies of doctrinal tradition, such a restric-
tive approach will very likely restrict or even prevent real 
change.278
We are therefore arguing against a reductionist view to solving 
property problems, which sees property doctrine as a neutral set 
of rules to be applied in an abstract manner. In Scotland, that 
means engaging with the context of property rights and the effect 
the exercise of these rights has had. Indeed, this context is very 
much alive in the political debate,279 if not the legal one.
B. THE APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN TWO 
CASES
At this point, we wish to discuss two concrete cases. In the 
first case, taking the suggested angle of approach would indicate 
legislative reforms are required and a different outcome to the 
case would then be possible, in the other the angle of approach 
supports the decision. The first case is Burnet v. Alpha280 a deci-
sion of the Housing and Property Chamber of the First-tier Tri-
bunal for Scotland. Scotland has recently reformed its residential 
tenancy regime with the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) 
Act 2016.281 One of the policy objectives of this Act is to “improve 
security of tenure for tenants and provide appropriate safeguards 
for landlords, lenders and investors.”282 A significant element of
the 2016 Act is the removal of the “no-fault” ground for reposses-
sion, which means that the landlord cannot ask the tenant to 
leave the property just because their tenancy agreement has 
come to an end.283 A landlord will only be able to reclaim posses-
278. VAN DER WALT, supra note 52, at 18-19.
279. See discussion supra Section II.B.
280. Burnet v. Alpha FTS/HPC/EV/19/0069, (2019) HPC 1, 2 (Scot.).
281. The protection afforded to residential tenants in Scotland has varied over the 
years based on the political party in power at the particular time. For an outline of 
the changes made through the years, see PETER ROBSON & MALCOLM COMBE,
RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES: PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RENTING IN SCOTLAND Ch 1 (4th ed. 
2019). 
282. Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum 2015 (SP 
Bill 79), ¶ 11. 
283. Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 19) § 44. 
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sion of the property if either the tenant wishes to leave284 or by 
satisfying to the First-tier Tribunal that one of the eighteen 
grounds for eviction applies.285 If one of the eviction grounds ap-
plies, then the First-tier Tribunal will issue an eviction order.286
Some of the eighteen grounds are mandatory, giving the Tribunal 
no scope for discretion, such as when the landlord intends to sell, 
refurbish or live in the property.287 In contrast, some grounds are 
discretionary, meaning that the Tribunal must consider whether
it is reasonable to issue the eviction order and this includes where 
the tenant is in breach of an obligation under tenancy agreement 
(other than to pay rent) or the tenant has been in rent arrears for 
three or more consecutive months, where the arrears are less 
than one month’s rent.288 The 2016 Act came into force on De-
cember 1, 2017, and the First-tier Tribunal has heard over 300 
cases regarding eviction since then.289 So far, eviction has been 
granted in 95% of cases.290
In Burnet v. Alpha,291 the landlord sought an order for evic-
tion in terms of the ground that the landlord intended to sell the 
property.292 The respondents had occupied the property by virtue 
of a private residential tenancy, which commenced on August 15, 
2018.293 A notice to leave had been served on the respondents on 
November 28, 2018, seeking their removal.294 By December 27, 
2018, the respondents failed to vacate the premises and so the 
landlord sought an eviction order.295 The respondents argued that 
they were actively looking for alternative accommodation.296
284. Id. at § 50, ¶ 1. 
285. Id. sch. 3, §§ 1-18. 
286. Id. § 51, ¶ 1. 
287. Id. sch. 3, §§ 1, 3, 4. 
288. Id. sch. 3, §§ 11, 12. 
289. See an overview of the emerging jurisprudence in Peter Robson & Malcolm 
Combe, The First Year of the First-Tier: Private Residential Tenancy Eviction Cases 
at the Housing and Property Chamber, 4 JURID. REV. 325 (2019). 
290. Id. at 330..
291. Burnet v. Alpha FTS/HPC/EV/19/0069, (2019) HPC 1, 2 (Scot.).
292. Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 (ASP 19) sch. 3, ¶ 1. 
293. Burnet v. Alpha [2019] FTS/HPC/EV/19/0069, (2019) HPC 1, 2 (Scot.). 
294. Id.
295. As the respondents had occupied the property for less than six months, the 
landlord was required to wait twenty-eight days before raising the action for eviction. 
See Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 19) § 54, ¶ 2(b)(i), ¶ 3(a).
296. Burnet v. Alpha FTS/HPC/EV/19/0069, (2019) HPC 1, 2 (Scot.). 
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However, they had a daughter with “special needs,”297 and had 
been unable to find suitable alternative accommodation.298 The 
respondents suggested three months would be sufficient to find 
such accommodation.299 The Tribunal was satisfied with the evi-
dence that the landlord intended to sell the property, and there-
fore granted the order for eviction.300 The Tribunal had no discre-
tion here, as this was a mandatory ground.
Taking the angle of approach provides a lens through which 
to critique this case. As noted above, this legislation has been 
passed to improve security of tenure whilst having appropriate 
safeguards for landlords. Yet, the lack of discretion on the part of 
the Tribunal in relation to the mandatory grounds is a weakness 
in the legislative regime that significantly undermines the protec-
tions provided to tenants.301 Why should the Tribunal not consid-
er whether it is reasonable to grant the eviction order in where 
the landlord intends to sell, whereas it will have such discretion 
where there is breach of a tenancy agreement? Robson and 
Combe state that the:
[R]ange of reasons whereby an eviction order must be grant-
ed to a landlord recognises the right of landlords to manage 
and dispose of their own property irrespective of the fact that 
the tenant may have a strong attachment to the rented home 
they are occupying and possibly a need to stay there for med-
ical, schooling or family reasons.302
The discrepancy between the discretionary and mandatory 
grounds was highlighted by McCarthy when the Bill was going 
through Scottish Parliament. McCarthy’s argument was that the 
obligation on the Tribunal to grant an eviction order without con-
297. What these needs are is not specified in the report. However, the term sug-
gests the daughter had a physical or mental disability.
298. Burnet v. Alpha FTS/HPC/EV/19/0069, (2019) HPC 1, 2 (Scot.). 
299. Id.
300. Id. at 3.
301. Robson and Combe state regarding the 2016 Act, “For tenants, they have some 
more certainty about their future with a non-specified tenacy duration. In reality, 
however, the extensive mandatory eviction grounds offer no guarantees. For protec-
tion, tenants will have to rely on a market with a satisfactory supply such that any 
eviction will be only a temporary hiccup and that the pool of similar housing in the 
area will offset the impact of the landlords’ extensive rights to evict.” PETER ROBSON 
& MALCOLM COMBE, RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES: PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RENTING IN 
SCOTLAND ¶ 1-29 (4th ed. 2019).
302. PETER ROBSON & MALCOLM COMBE, RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES: PRIVATE AND 
SOCIAL RENTING IN SCOTLAND ¶ 10-04 (4th ed. 2019).
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sidering the circumstances of the case, is likely to be a dispropor-
tionate interference with the tenant’s rights under Art 8 of the 
ECHR, which provides the right to respect for a private and fami-
ly life.303 McCarthy explains that it is clear in relation to tenants 
of local authorities that the circumstances of the individual case 
must be considered to ensure the proportionality of the evic-
tion.304 This principle could then be extended to leases between 
private individuals or entities because the court is an organ of the 
State, and it should not act in a manner incompatible with ECHR 
rights.
This argument, based on the ECHR, has now been rejected 
by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the case of McDonald 
v. McDonald305 and the subsequent European Court of Human 
Rights decision of F.J.M. v. United Kingdom.306 The European 
Court of Human Rights stated that if the domestic courts were 
able to override the balance struck between ECHR rights in legis-
lation, then the ECHR would become directly enforceable be-
tween private citizens.307 However, using the suggested angle of 
approach may reopen this contentious issue. We would begin with 
the principle that there is a single system of law which is built 
upon fundamental rights and values. Property serves a relatively 
modest role in this system insofar as other fundamental rights 
and values are (or should be) given effect to before a property 
right is secured or protected. The regulation of property is an in-
herent part of this system and regulation serves the broader val-
ues of the system. The provisions in, and the policy of, the 2016 
Act engages with the themes in the LRRS and VGGT that there 
should be a human rights-based approach to the governance of 
land, which includes economic, social and cultural rights, and 
which emphasizes the responsibilities of the holders of land 
303. Frankie McCarthy, Opinion: Frankie McCarthy, L. SOC’Y OF SCOT. (Jan. 18, 
2016): https://www.lawscot.org.uk/members/journal/issues/vol-61-issue-01/opinion-
frankie-mccarthy/. See also Frankie McCarthy, Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scot-
land) Bill – Response to Call for Evidence, FRANKIE MCCARTHY: A BLOG (Nov. 16, 
2015): https://drfmccarthy.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/private-housing-tenancies-
scotland-bill-response-to-call-for-evidence/.
304. Citing Manchester City Council v. Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 (UKSC); South 
Lanarkshire Council v. McKenna (2013) SC 212 (Scot.). See also Frankie McCarthy, 
Human Rights and Discrimination, in LEASES Ch. 16 (2015); Frankie McCarthy, 
Human Rights and the Law of Leases, 17(2) EDINB. L. REV. 184 (2013).
305. McDonald v. McDonald (2017) AC 273 (UKSC).
306. F.J.M. v. United Kingdom, No. 76202/16, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ ¶ 16, 46 (2018).
307. Id. at ¶ 42.
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet N
o. 165 Side B      02/04/2021   09:17:00
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet No. 165 Side B      02/04/2021   09:17:00
C M
Y K
_8-ROBBIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 3:26 PM
612 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 66
rights. Eviction from one’s home may not only interfere with the 
tenant’s right to respect for her private and family life, but also 
the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right of 
housing.
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights has recently stated that all people should have a de-
gree of security of tenure, including those in rented accommoda-
tion, whether public or private.308 It has further stated that when 
“eviction is justified, the relevant authorities must ensure that it 
is carried out in accordance with legislation that is compatible
with the Covenant, including the principle of human dignity con-
tained in the preamble, in accordance with the general principles 
of reasonableness and proportionality.”309 Regulating the process 
of eviction as between private individuals of course also involves 
engaging with the protection of the landlord’s property under Art 
1, Pro 1. However, as highlighted above, property serves a rela-
tively modest role in the system of law, which may have to give 
way when other fundamental rights, such as when the right to 
private and family life, and the right to housing are involved. 
Taking this perspective, we would suggest a legislative amend-
ment to the 2016 Act so that in all cases of eviction, the Tribunal 
should consider whether is it reasonable to grant the eviction or-
der.310 In making that decision, the Tribunal can consider the in-
dividual circumstances of the case and should deliberate regard-
ing which other fundamental rights or values of the system are 
engaged or implicated.
There could be an additional element to be considered here, 
again, inspired by the South African jurisprudence. In the cir-
308. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, Djazia v. Spain, ¶ 2.4, 13.2, 16.5, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/20165 (July 21, 
2017). Here, Spain was found to have violated the right to housing of the applicants 
by the UN Committee through evicting a family at the request of a private landlady 
without providing them with alternative accommodation. 
309. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Djazia v. Spain, ¶ 13.4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/61/D/5/20165 (July 21, 2017).
310. McCarthy provides an example of the potential amendment to the wording of 
the 2016 Act in Frankie McCarthy, Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Bill – Re-
sponse to Call for Evidence, FRANKIE MCCARTHY: A BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015) 
https://drfmccarthy.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/private-housing-tenancies-scotland-
bill-response-to-call-for-evidence/. Temporary amendments were made to the 2016 
Act during the Coronavirus pandemic to make all eviction grounds discretionary. 
Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020, (ASP 7) sch. 1, § 1. These amendments could be 
made permanent. 
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet N
o. 166 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet No. 166 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
C M
Y K
_8-ROBBIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 3:26 PM
2020] Assembling A Sustainable System 613
cumstances of the case, it may be reasonable to grant the eviction 
order, but there is a secondary consideration of when the eviction 
order should be granted. South African cases have established 
that private entities are not required to provide housing for occu-
piers indefinitely, thus fulfilling the responsibilities of the State. 
However, landlords’ rights to possession may be subject to some 
delay in order to accommodate the immediate needs of the occu-
piers.311 In the consideration of when to grant an eviction order, 
the availability of suitable alternative accommodation should be a 
relevant consideration. To take this approach in relation to the 
Scottish legislation would suggest an additional amendment to 
the 2016 Act that the date that the eviction order is implemented 
should also be reasonable. If these amendments were made to the 
legislation, this would allow the court to grant the eviction order 
in Burnet v. Alpha if it was deemed reasonable in the circum-
stances, but only after the period of three months had passed in 
order to allow sufficient time for the family to find alternative ac-
commodation.
The second case we will discuss is Salmon Net Fishing Ass’n 
of Scotland v. Scottish Ministers.312 Here, taking the suggested 
angle of approach would support the decision of the court. This 
case was a decision of the Outer House of the Court of Session, in 
a petition for judicial review by an association representing the 
interests of people holding title to salmon fishings,313 against leg-
islation that prohibited retaining salmon caught in coastal waters 
-the Conservation of Salmon (Scotland) Regulations 2016,314 to-
311. See Johannesburg Metro. Mun. v. Blue Moonlight Prop. 29 (Pty) Ltd. 2012 (2) 
SA 104 (CC) at ¶ 96-97, 104(e)(iii) (S. Afr.); City of Johannesburg v. Changing Tides 
74 (Pty) Ltd. 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) at ¶ 18 (S. Afr.). An example of the application of
these principles is in the South African case of Berman Bros. Prop. Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd. v. Madikana 2019 (2) SA 685 (WCC) at 3 (S. Afr.), where an eviction order was 
deferred until one of the children in the property finished her school year, taking into
account the requirement in the Constitution to consider the paramountcy of the in-
terests of children. This decision was based on the provisions of the Prevention of Il-
legal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
312. Salmon Net Fishing Ass’n of Scotland v. Scottish Ministers (2020) SC 11 
(Scot.). See also Colin Reid, Fishing Ban Did Not Breach Property Rights, 198 
SCOTTISH PLAN. & ENV’T L. 42 (2020).
313. In Scotland, salmon fishing rights are a distinct property right which can be 
held separately from the ownership of land. See generally KENNETH G.C. REID, THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY IN SCOTLAND ¶¶ 320-30 (1996). 
314. Conservation of Salmon (Scotland) Reg. 2016 reg. 3, as amended by Conserva-
tion of Salmon (Scotland) Reg. 2019 reg. 2.
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gether with a related compensation scheme.315 The petitioners 
argued that the 2016 Regulations and compensation scheme were 
in breach of Art 1, Pro 1 of the ECHR because they did not strike
a fair balance between the property rights of the petitioners and 
the general interests of the wider community.316 Lord Pentland in 
the Outer House described the background of the 2016 Regula-
tions, which were a response to the European Commission con-
sidering that the United Kingdom had failed to take sufficient 
conservation measures in relation to Atlantic salmon populations 
in Scotland in light of declining salmon populations.317 A review 
between 2018-2019, based on scientific studies, indicated that the 
prohibition should remain in place for an indeterminate period as 
there was no evidence that salmon populations would recover in 
the foreseeable future.318 A compensation scheme was then of-
fered by the Scottish Ministers, which was to be a one-off pay-
ment intended to allow those with salmon fishing rights to cease 
their operations based on the net profits of individual fishermen 
for a ten-year period.319
Lord Pentland decided that there had not been a violation of 
Art 1, Pro 1 in this case.320 His Lordship considered that the in-
terference with the property of the fishermen through the prohi-
bition on fishing was based on sound reasons of conservation and 
environmental protection, and to ensure compliance with re-
quirements of European Union law.321 In these circumstances, 
there was not an entitlement to receive full compensation for all 
the financial losses which may flow from the measures.322
315. Salmon Net Fishing Ass’n of Scotland v. Scottish Ministers (2020) SC 11, ¶ 2 
(Scot.).
316. Id. at ¶ 4 (Scot.).
317. Salmon are a protected species under the European Union’s Directive 
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and fauna. As 
the United Kingdom has now left the European Union, it is unclear to what extent 
environmental governance standards will be maintained. See Annalisa Savaresi, En-
vironmental Governance in Scotland after EU Exit, SV 20-02 (2020), https://sp-bpr-
en-prod-cdnep.azureedge.net/published/2020/1/9/Environmental-Governance-in-
Scotland-after-EU-Exit/SB%2020-02.pdf.
318. Salmon Net Fishing Ass’n of Scotland v. Scottish Ministers (2020) SC 11, ¶ 19, 
21 (Scot.).
319. Id. at ¶ 44.  The salmon fishing rights were not extinguished; they could mere-
ly not be exercised for the foreseeable future. Id. at ¶ 27.
320. Id. at ¶ 65.
321. Id. at ¶ 65, 67.
322. Id. at ¶ 65.
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet N
o. 167 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
42795-llr_66-2 Sheet No. 167 Side A      02/04/2021   09:17:00
C M
Y K
_8-ROBBIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 3:26 PM
2020] Assembling A Sustainable System 615
The angle of approach would support this decision. There is a 
single system of law, which includes provisions implementing Eu-
ropean Union directives. This system of law is founded on funda-
mental rights and values, which include sustainable development 
and environmental protection. The holders of property rights 
have responsibilities due to the effect the exercise of their rights 
can have on the environment. The regulation of property, in this 
instance an indeterminate prohibition on exercise of fishing 
rights, is an inherent part of this system and is intended to serve 
the broader values of the system. As stated by the VGGT, “[a]ll 
should respect the long-term protection and sustainable use of 
land, fisheries and forests.”323
VI.  CONCLUSION
The function of property in the modern context is dichoto-
mous. On the one hand, the institution of property is vehemently 
defended for its role in promoting individual liberty and creating 
a space free from the threat of State interference, which is condu-
cive to economic prosperity. On the other hand, there is a societal 
interest in property that strongly rejects the idea of allowing 
rights-holders to use and exploit their property without due re-
gard for the effects of such use on society or the environment. 
There is no magic formula that will always provide clear answers 
or that can successfully sidestep having to make difficult deci-
sions regarding the purpose of property in society, as well as the 
priorities of each legal system. However, we suspect that an ap-
proach that prides itself in being abstract in application, which 
focuses primarily on stability and certainty, purposefully leaving 
very little room for contextual considerations, and which func-
tions optimally in a hierarchal way, is not the way to give effect to 
the democratic call for change evident in both the LRRS and 
VGGT.
Within this article, we have explored new developments in 
property law reform in Scotland, and how the impact of these re-
form measures could be limited by current features of private law 
methodology and the Scottish legal system. We analyzed the 
South African experience of transformation of its property regime 
and considered the developments on both the theoretical and 
methodological level which have emerged to implement that 
323. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 
71 at ¶ 4.3. 
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transformation. In our view, the new approach to property and 
regulation in South Africa, as seen in the systemic constitutional 
approach, sheds light on the challenges facing the Scottish regime 
and suggests an equally pressing need for a new angle of ap-
proach. In this process, we have disputed the claim quoted in the 
introduction that constitutional property law questions in Scot-
land and South Africa are “too different for any comparative exer-
cise to have primary utility.”324 In fact, we claim that South Afri-
ca’s experience may contain important lessons for a property 
system, like Scotland, which is undergoing a period of transfor-
mation.325 Ensuring the full implementation of such a transfor-
mation is necessary if we are going to have a chance to tackle the 
global challenges which currently make up our unsustainable 
way of life.
324. David Carey Miller, The Human Right of Property in Land Law: Comparing 
South Africa and Scotland, in 18 PRIVATE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 480 (2014).
325. Indeed, hints at a systemic approach have also been made with South Africa, 
particularly in relation to attempts to tackle social injustice and environmental deg-
radation within the context of property law. See, e.g., Nicole Graham, Owning the 
Earth, in EXPLORING THE WILD: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE (2011); 
Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 Duke L.J. 1287 (2014);
FRITJOF CAPRA & UGO MATTEI, THE ECOLOGY OF LAW: TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
TUNE WITH NATURE AND COMMUNITY (2015); Lynda L. Butler, Property’s Problem 
with Extremes 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV 1, 31-51 (2018). 
